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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this research is to investigate whether distress firm creditors get better 
or worse recoveries during the financial restructuring process in Norwegian Bond market. To 
investigate that question we have created a sample using Norsk Tillitsmann database. For the 
criterion we needed firms in the data sample that went through financial restructuring due to 
financial distress or financial. We managed to get hold of ninety seven bonds using the above 
criterion.  The sample was composed of different classes of bonds according to their seniority, 
but majority was senior secured and senior unsecured bonds. We have also divided the sample 
into five broader industry classifications and the majority of the sample firms were oil and gas 
related. 
During the literature review process we came up with a few hypotheses and tried to find 
evidence of them in the sample. For this purpose we conducted a layman analysis, i.e. 
descriptive analysis in which we came to conclusion that creditors are better off if the 
borrower is in oil and gas industry and if they hold senior secured or senior unsecured 
securities. We also found descriptive evidence that debt exchange produce higher “abnormal” 
return for distress firm’s creditors than debt to equity swap.  
Finally we conducted statistical tests on the sample to find the evidence of stated hypotheses 
to see if the results are statistical significant or not. The results were not significant to the 
hypothesis that seniority and collateral leads to higher abnormal returns; however there are 
strong indications that the industry as well as debt exchange or equity swap are relevant 
factors for higher abnormal returns. 
Also examined was if bondholders recoveries are being affected by the gearing (leverage) of 
the distress firm and also by the time to maturity (settlement date) of the bonds. In regression 
analysis we did not find both of these to be significant affecting bondholders’ returns however 
we did notice that almost all of the firms had 66% to 80% debt in their capital structure. As 
well we believed that high leverage is the reason for them to be in distress. In our sample of 
there is one financial restructuring (Sevan Marine ASA) that stands out with the clear 
violation of Absolute Priority Rule (APR), and there were other minor APR violation in not 
so strict sense. 
The final conclusion we drew from analyzing the sample is that a creditor’s or investor’s in 
the Norwegian bond market should place themselves in the Oil & Gas industry and negotiate 
for debt exchanges during restructurings process to get higher abnormal returns.  
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1. INTRODUCTION	
Financial distress is a condition, where a firm has broken or finding it hard to honor the 
promises made to creditors. The most comprehensive definition of distressed and marginal 
firms is found in (CHAN & CHEN, 1991). They have defined a distressed firm as one that 
“have  lost  market value because  of poor  performance, they  are  inefficient producers, and  
they  are likely   to  have  high  financial  leverage and  cash  flow  problems. They  are 
marginal in the  sense  that their prices  tend  to be more sensitive to changes in the  economy,  
and  they  are  less likely  to survive adverse economic conditions.” Important question that 
arises in here is why to rescue a trouble company when it has no viable future in the long 
term? To answer this question we have to look into the concept of market-based economy, if 
the liquidation value of a distressed firm is greater than the realized value as an ongoing 
concern, then the distress firm should be liquidated and  financial, physical and human 
resources are to be released for more productive use in the economy (Chatterji & Hedges, 
2001). However, if the realized value is greater than the liquidated value of the distressed 
company, the stakeholders and economy would benefit if the firm is rescued. Often in practice 
it is very difficult to accurately determine whether the firm has a viable long term future and 
should be rescued or whether it should be liquidated. To some extent this could be attributed 
to the fact that managers have superior information regarding the company then stakeholders, 
and liquidating a company is against their interest even though it may be the best option 
available. This information asymmetry gives rise to lot of uncertainties among stakeholders 
during the financial distress.  
Creditors in a financially distressed firm face a dilemma, in which the firm cannot fulfill its’ 
commitments towards the creditors because of insufficient cash flows. Then the creditors have 
to choose between selling their securities at market price, which is very low compared to the 
nominal value of security, or accepting the distress exchange in the form of debt exchange or 
debt to equity swap1 
The main objective of this research is to investigate whether creditors in the Norwegian bond 
market obtained higher or lower return when they accept the restructuring deal put forward by 
management as compared to trading price returns. We call this measurement “abnormal 
returns” in a sense that if the return of accepting the deal has positive value then creditors got 
a good deal and vice versa. The term “abnormal return” is preferred because it can have a 
                                                 
1 1 Debt exchange (for detail see section Distressed Exchange 4.1.5) and debt to equity swap (for see details 
section 4.1.6). 
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both positive and negative value and convey a meaningful explanation to the creditors and 
readers of this research. As well it measures the “extra” returns credit-holders of financially 
distress firm earn by not selling their security at the market price to earn trading price 
recovery. Trading price recoveries is an elusive concept in a sense that we are taking the 
average trading price recovery of a same class of securities and comparing it with ultimate 
recoveries (discounted value of cash flow and equity value if any, of restructuring proposal). 
There could be many factors that could affect the trading price recoveries, one such being is 
the market or fund liquidity, if the funds available for distressed investments are not enough 
to cover for the distress investment opportunities. This is much harder to measures because of 
information access and also it is beyond the scope of this study. 
2. Research	Question	and	Hypotheses	
The central question this research is investigating is “whether creditors in financial distress 
firm are obtaining higher returns than trading price returns during the financial restructuring 
in the Norwegian Bond Market?” Along with the central question the following hypothesis 
that emerged during the literature review process are to be confirmed or rejected by analyzing 
the sample for the study.  
 Distressed firm’s creditors only accept the restructuring deal when their ultimate 
recoveries are higher than trading price recoveries i.e. (have positive value of 
abnormal returns). 
 If distressed firm’s creditors accept the restructuring proposal then their recoveries 
should not depend on which distress exchange instrument is used i.e. debt exchange or 
debt-to-equity swap. 
 When distributing the value to creditors in financial restructuring Absolute Priority 
Rule (APR) should hold up. 
3. Importance	of	the	research	
According to the authors’ point of view this study has far reaching implication, in the sense 
that this study can enhance the chances of sound investments in the bond market in general 
and mitigate the risk associated with holding distressed bonds in particular. The first option is 
for distressed securities investors, and the second would be more inclined to help large fund 
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holders of bonds in the portfolio to decide if holding the bond throughout a restructuring of a 
borrower in distress is worth risk taking for. 
The study can have a profound impact on financial distress creditors’ decision making e.g. 
their decision about what class of securities to hold, decision about which type of 
restructuring instrument (debt exchange or debt-to-equity swap) to accept in the restructuring 
negotiations. As well with the help of this research the creditors will have a significant insight 
to all the issue related to restructuring of a distress firm. This study will contribute toward the 
better understanding of financial restructuring process because of financial distress from the 
creditors point of view and the reason being is during the literature review we have not come 
across a research which has looked into the matter from creditors point of view, and measure 
if the creditors were better or worse off as a result of restructuring proposal. Even though 
creditors have their own risk preferences but with the help of this study they will get an 
insight into risk associated with different class of debt claims for distress firm.  
Financial institutions that are engaged in the consulting business can also benefit from this 
study, by giving advice to creditors and distressed firms alike as to which course of action is 
in their best interest to remedy financial distress, and to acquire better returns than trading 
price returns in case of creditors.   
It also serves as a thesis to gather ideas for future students in finance and business to either 
test the results of this thesis, or develop the models further than what is done in this thesis. 
4. Theoretical	foundation	
This Thesis is divided into different sections. These sections are set to mimic the narrative of 
the whole thesis.  
Section 4 will lay down the theoretical foundation for the thesis by defining various concept 
used in the thesis like distress, defaults, restructuring etc. As well it will explain different 
instruments used to resolve distressed situation. Along with that this section will also present 
theory regarding calculate recovery rates, absolute priority rule and what is order of priority of 
claims in Norway.  
Section 5 will describe the different valuation techniques used to value distressed exchange 
instruments. This is an important section because it forms the foundation for the calculation of 
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the value of the restructuring proposals to the bondholders. This in turn will be used to 
calculate “Ultimate recovery” and “Abnormal returns”. 
Section 6 with explains the measurement called “Abnormal returns” that has been used in the 
thesis. The term abnormal return measure is nonexistence in the literature review performed. 
This is not to say that it cannot exist, perhaps described in another form however it was not 
come across in the literary review. 
Section 7 will describe the sample data in details. 
Section 8 will describe different analysis methods used to analyzed sample data. Mainly 
Descriptive analysis in which data will be analyze in the form of table and graphs for the 
layman to understand the association between abnormal and ultimate returns and various bond 
characteristics. This section as well has statistical analysis. It will explain and describe the 
different statistical models that are used in the thesis. As well this section will test whether the 
results obtained in statistical tests can be used for statistical inference by using Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) criterion. 
Section 9 will mention in detail the limitation for the thesis and suggests issues for further 
research.  
Section 10 will have a detailed conclusion based on the descriptive and regression analysis 
and reason for getting specific results. 
4.1. Distress,	Default,	Restructuring	&	Recoveries	
4.1.1. Financial Distress: 
A firm is said to be in financial distress when it cannot honor its commitments to creditors, 
then lenders have the option to restructure the loan or foreclose. In case where lenders decide 
for liquidation, they either sell the assets immediately or sell it on a later date, it is costly for 
lenders to carry an asset in inventory(Brown, Ciochetti, & Riddiough, 2006). 
Financial distress in a firm occurs when operating cash flows of the firm are not adequate 
enough to fulfill debt obligation and this will force the firm to make some corrective actions. 
The consequence of the financial distress could be that it can default on its debt obligations 
this can either lead to either liquidation or financial restructuring; financial restructuring could 
be private workout or in court legal bankruptcy proceeding. Financial distress for firms does 
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not means that they will cease to exist. There are difference techniques used by the distressed 
firms to solve financial distress, which are as followings 
 Divestment of assets. 
 Issuing new securities. 
 Debt for equity swap. 
 Negotiations with creditors to amend term/terms of covenant. 
 Filling for bankruptcy proceeding.  
 
Figure 1: Timeline of financial distress firm adopted from  adopted from (CRS, 2008) 
Figure 1 depicts the timeline of a financial distressed firm when it is underperforming, in the 
first phase management will make some corrective action to fix the problem, normally banks 
or major creditors consent is not required but maybe informed as a matter of courtesy. The 
management led actions are taken before the financial health of the company deteriorates 
further and creditors become concerned about the future of the firm.  Normally management 
led corrective action have a high level of success rate either because the problems are not too 
severe or that the management is in the best position that understand the problem and suggest 
solutions. These management led corrective actions can lead the financially underperforming 
firm to a healthy company or the firm continues to underperform and then get into the 
situation where its operating cash flows are not enough to cover the debt obligations (interest 
payment and installment) it has, then the company is in serious financial distress, at this point 
firm’s management has to inform creditors about the situation and work-out a solution to 
reduce the firm’s liabilities so that it can reemerge as a financially healthy firm. There are 
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number of ways creditors can help reduce financial obligations of the firm, such as by 
extending the maturity of the loan, lowering the interest rate, reduction in the nominal debt 
amount and even debt for equity swap. But all this is conditioned on one major point i.e. 
whether distress firm has a viable economic future or not, if creditors believe that the firms 
has a viable economic future they will work together with the management and will find the 
solution to distressed situation and as a consequence firm might emerge as financially healthy 
state, but if they do not see that the firm has a viable economic future they will prefer to 
liquidate the firm for the fulfill their claims.   
It is also important to explain the difference between insolvency and financial illiquidity (cash 
flow insolvency). The insolvency occurs when the firm’s assets are less than the value of its 
debt and cash flow insolvency occurs when the firm’s operating cash flows are not enough to 
cover its contractual obligations towards the debt holders.  
 
 
 
 
 
In the left hand side of Figure 2 it is clearly evident that value of firms assets are more than 
debt and the residual value is for equity holders, but on the right hand side it is a different 
story, the value of firm’s assets is less than the value of its debt obligation and there is no 
residual value for equity holders, because equity is like a call option with following function 
max(0, V-D). If any firm is in this situation then it is said to be insolvent.  
Assets 
Equity 
Debt 
Assets 
Debt 
Figure 2: Description of Insolvency 
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Figure 3: Depiction of financial distress when firm cannot service interest payments and installments 
In Error! Reference source not found. it is clearly evident that the firm’s financial health is 
deteriorating with time and its operations are not producing enough cash flows to cover for 
contractual obligation, this force the firm to be in financial distress. There could be number of 
different reasons for the firm to go into financial distress e.g. economic downturn, 
uncompetitive products or services, unrealistic business plan, poor management, lack of 
access to market, deterioration of operating performance and large off balance sheet 
contingent liabilities. (Moyer, 2005; Whitman & Diz, 2009) 
4.1.2. Default 
In its simplest form default means a borrower will fail to meet its obligation set according to 
agreed terms. More specifically “A failure to pay principal of or interest on a bond when due 
or a failure to comply with any other covenant, promise or duty imposed by the bond contract.  
The most serious event of default, sometimes referred to as a “monetary” default, occurs 
when the issuer fails to pay principal, interest, or both, when due.  Other defaults sometimes 
referred to as “technical” defaults, result when specifically defined events of default occur, 
such as failure to maintain covenants.  Technical defaults may include failing to charge rates 
sufficient to meet rate covenants, failing to maintain insurance on the project or failing to fund 
various reserves.  If the issuer defaults in the payment of principal, interest, or both, or if a 
technical default is not cured within a specified period of time, the bondholders or trustee may 
exercise legally available rights and remedies for enforcement of the bond contract”.(MSRB, 
2004)  
Technical default occurs when affirmative or a negative covenant is violated. When certain 
clauses in the indentures stipulates that the borrower has  to maintain certain ratios or capital 
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such as net working capital, debt service coverage etc. are violated, it is called affirmative 
covenant violation.  
When certain (negative) clauses in the debt contract that  restrain, limit and prohibits the 
borrower from certain actions, such as sales of certain assets, payment of dividends etc. that 
can damage creditors are violated it is called negative covenant violation. Violations of 
negative covenant are very rare.  
A default is recorded upon the first occurrence of a payment default on any financial 
obligation, rated or unrated, other than a financial obligation subject to a bona fide 
commercial dispute; an exception occurs when an interest payment missed on the due date is 
made within the grace period.  
Preferred stock is not considered a financial obligation; thus, a missed preferred stock 
dividend is not normally equated with default. Distressed exchanges, on the other hand, are 
considered defaults whenever the debt holders are coerced into accepting substitute 
instruments with lower coupons, longer maturities, or any other diminished financial 
terms.(S&P, 2003) 
Moody’s definition of default is applicable only to debt or debt-like obligations (e.g., swap 
agreements). Four events constitute a debt default under Moody’s definition: 
a) A missed or delayed disbursement of a contractually-obligated interest or principal 
payment (excluding missed payments cured within a contractually allowed grace period), as 
defined in credit agreements and indentures; 
b) A bankruptcy filing or legal receivership by the debt issuer or obligor that will likely cause 
a miss or delay in future contractually-obligated debt service payments; 
c) a distressed exchange whereby 1) an obligor offers creditors a new or restructured debt, or 
a new package of securities, cash or assets that amount to a diminished financial obligation 
relative to the original obligation and 2) the exchange has the effect of allowing the obligor to 
avoid a bankruptcy or payment default in the future; or 
d) A change in the payment terms of a credit agreement or indenture imposed by the 
sovereign, that results in a diminished financial obligation, such as a forced currency re-
denomination (imposed by the debtor himself, or his sovereign) or a forced change in some 
other aspect of the original promise, such as indexation or maturity. 
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Moody’s definition of default does not include so-called “technical defaults,” such as 
maximum leverage or minimum debt coverage violations, unless the obligor fails to cure the 
violation and fails to honor the resulting debt acceleration which may be required. Also 
excluded are payments owed on long-term debt obligations which are missed due to purely 
technical or administrative errors which are 1) not related to the ability or willingness to make 
the payments and 2) are cured in very short order (typically, 1-2 business days).(Moody's, 
2011) 
4.1.3. Bankruptcy and Restructurings 
When a distressed firm defaults on its obligations towards its creditors, the creditors have a 
claim on the assets of the firm. In some cases reorganization occurs and the creditors agree to 
a partial payment of their claims. In other cases assets are sold and the proceeds are 
distributed among the different creditors based on the priority of their claim. In principle 
junior claimants should not get any proceeds before a full settlement of the senior claimants 
are performed, this is known as the “Absolute Priority Rule”. 
Stakeholders in the firm rank differently in priority of their claims, for example secured 
creditors rank higher than unsecured if the borrower is to be liquidated then proceeds from 
liquidation will be distributed to the firm’s creditors according to the rule of Absolute Priority 
Rule (APR). The APR stats that unsecured creditor should not receive any proceeds before the 
secured creditors claim is fully satisfied, which mean the prospect of loss is greater for 
unsecured creditors.  
Creditors in the firm have different seniorities in the capital structure and for that reason the 
risk and reward they have in a restructuring process, makes them follow different courses of 
action and also they have divergent interest. To avoid this problem corporate rescue and 
recovery framework are developed that provides rules and mechanism to reduce the 
uncertainty and to protect the interest of stakeholders’. (Chatterji & Hedges, 2001). These 
frameworks provide rules regarding how to distribute firm’s assets among different 
stakeholders in accordance with the agreed upon principals of claims priority (APR).  
Frameworks to rescue distressed firms can be of two types. The first can be based on 
insolvency legislation of the country where the company is registered. The second can be 
voluntary and not backed and dependent on any legislation.  
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Statutory insolvency frameworks provide rules and procedures on how to distribute proceeds 
from assets sale. These frameworks also provides a mechanism to preserve the firm intact if 
the value realized from keeping the firm as a going concern is greater than the value realized 
if it were liquidated.  
The frameworks will also include the procedures to provide for a change of ownership, this 
would be the case when debt to equity swaps takes place and ownership of the firm is simply 
transferred to the debt holders. 
Statutory insolvency frameworks in different countries can be categorized into either creditor 
or debtor friendly. In creditor friendly countries control of the company is taken away from 
management and shareholders when the firm files for formal procedures. In debtor friendly 
countries the company is allowed to continue operating by the incumbent management or by 
an appointed trustee and it also encourages the debtors to forgive some parts of their claims 
for the restructuring to be successful.  
 
Figure 4: Creditor- and Debtor-friendly countries (Wood, 1995) cited in (Chatterji & Hedges, 2001) 
Figure 4 depicts countries from pro-creditor to pro-debtor on a horizontal scale. Norway is 
ranked somewhat in between pro-creditor and pro-debtor. In some cases the parties involved 
in a financial restructuring agree to restructure voluntarily out of court rather than going to the 
court of law. This approach was first proposed by the Bank of England in the 1990s, and it is 
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known as the London Approach. The main advantage of this approach is that different parties 
involved in financial restructurings can engaged in the negotiation without losing their 
relative position in the process.  Voluntary rescue frameworks can be formally defined as “A 
set of principles or guidelines that facilitate the rescue of commercially viable enterprises by 
providing a framework under which the stakeholders (principally financial creditors) can 
agree to a mutually acceptable course of action, in a stable environment on the basis of full 
and reliable information, without resort  to the courts”(Chatterji & Hedges, 2001) 
4.1.4. Loan workout or out of court settlement 
Sometimes the parties involved in financial restructurings enter into a negotiation to find a 
workable solution to solve the distressed situation voluntarily, not compelled by the court to 
do so. The main advantage of this type of settlement is that negotiation can be held in private 
without making them public and this will avoid uncertainty, and will not make the firm 
unstable. The largest disadvantage of out-of-court settlement is that all the parties involved or 
affected by the restructuring have to agree to the restructuring proposal, this can sometimes 
create a problem called “hold out”2 
 The main objective for the distressed firm is to enhance its ability to service the debt 
obligations. This can be done by one of the following 
1) Reduce the nominal or present value of debt. 
2) Extension of the maturity date. 
3) Induction of new finances. 
4) An appropriate restructuring of the firm, so that it can have a commercially viable long 
term future.  
4.1.5. Distressed Exchange  
The classic technique that is employed by distressed firms to solve their distressed situation is 
distressed exchanges (DE). This tactic is normally employed to avoid bankruptcy of the 
distressed firm who is unable to meet its obligations to the creditors. In distressed exchanges 
the  firm proposes a fundamental change in contractual relationships between the debtor and 
                                                 
2 The holdout problem occurs when some bondholder in a distress firm withhold their consent to financial 
restructuring to disrupt the restructuring process, they are gambling on the fact that restructuring will go through 
even without their consent and they will receive full payment of their claims as they are entitled to according to 
the debt contract but same time other bondholders who have consent to restructuring will receive reduce 
payment as set forth by the restructuring plan. 
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the various creditors classes, and it is voluntarily agreed upon by a sufficient percentage 
(normally 90% or more) of relevant creditors’ claims (Altman & Karlin, 2009). 
Distressed exchanges can involve one of, or a combination of the following 
1) Exchange of debt claim to lower priority equity. 
2) Extension of the maturity date.3 
3) Reduction of effective interest rate on the debt. 
4) Subordination of claims 
5) New securities with face value less than the face value of the original claim. 
The main rationale behind distressed exchanges is that the restructuring is less costly than a 
bankruptcy to the firm, however a  few studies have found that a majority of the firms that 
performed distressed exchanges  ended up in bankruptcy at a later date.(Altman & Karlin, 
2009; Gilson, John, & Lang, 1990) 
4.1.6. Debt to Equity Swap 
Since one of the main objectives of a distressed firm is to reduce their debt level to a level 
where the business can service the debt without any difficulty and continue as a viable 
business for a long term, one of the techniques used is a debt-to-equity swap i.e. the financial 
creditors receives equity interest in a reorganized capital structure for reducing their claims.   
Converting debt to equity strengthens the distressed firm’s balance sheet and the firm’s 
financials, and avoids an imminent insolvent liquidation. Sometimes opportunistic 
creditors/investors purposely get a hold of sub-performing debt, to gain control of the debtor 
in a so called “loan to own” strategy.  
Debt-to-equity swaps can be formally defined as “Capital reorganizations in which the 
creditors (usually, but not exclusively, lenders) exchange or convert a proportion of a 
company’s indebtedness for one or more classes of its share capital4”(Chatterji & Hedges, 
2001). Debt to equity swaps change the structure of the liabilities in the balance sheet and 
replace the firm’s obligations to its creditors with share capital. There are few ways this can 
be carried out i.e. debt can be converted to equity, it is a book transaction where repayment 
received by creditors is used to subscribe for new shares in the firms.  
                                                 
3 It is a custom in Norway when there is extension of maturity date, coupon rate increase by 5% p.a. 
4 Fund raised in the firm, by issuing new shares, in return for cash or other considerations.  
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A debt-to-equity swap is beneficial for the debtor because it reduces the debt to an optimal 
level, and the firm can operate effectively as a going concern. Resources (time and money) 
spent in formal restructuring procedures is quite considerable as compared to debt-to-equity 
swaps; it can make a distressed firm viable in medium to long term. However this does not 
mean that debt-to-equity swaps is simple procedure, it is highly complex transaction. The 
major issue in debt-to-equity swaps is to determine the value of the business and how much 
debt the firm is likely to support. The major drawback of debt-to-equity swap is, it only cures 
the financial symptoms of the distressed firm rather than the underlying problems of the 
company.  
4.1.7. Recovery calculation: 
There are two ways to calculate recovery rates on a bond i.e. trading price recoveries and ultimate 
recoveries. Trading price recoveries on the bond is the bond’s market value a few days5  after the 
default as a percentage of bond’s face value.  
Ultimate recoveries are the values that creditors realize at the time of resolution of the default 
event. For example, when a firm files for bankruptcy, the ultimate recovery is the present 
value of the cash and or securities that the creditors actually receive when the firm exits 
bankruptcy, normally 1-2 years following the initial default date. (Moody's, 2011) 
The recovery rate6 is the amount that creditors recovers of their principal and accrued interest 
due to default. (Mora, 2012) has found that recovery and default rates are inversely related, 
which means that if adverse economic conditions makes defaults rise, such bad economic 
conditions can also make the recoveries to the creditors fall i.e. creditors recoveries depends 
on collateral value and during economic downturn the value of the collateral is expected to 
fall because of reduce business opportunities.  
(Mora, 2012) used thirty years recovery data on defaulted debt instruments from the United 
States and found that the state of the economy does determined the creditors recovery rate and 
in addition industry distress also drives recovery rates down, as this is triggered by overall 
weak economy conditions.  
Credit risk is defined by Bank for International Settlement as the potential that a borrower will 
fail to meet its obligations in accordance with the agreed terms. Or simply it is the risk that the 
                                                 
5 Moody’s use 30 days after default date. 
6 Majority of this section is based on Moody’s Default Risk Service Data compiled by (Mora, 2012) 
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borrower will default on the debt by not making the payments which it is obliged to pay under 
the contract. 
 Credit risk consist of the probability that a borrower will default on its obligation, its loss 
given default (which is one minus recovery rate) and exposure at default. That means credit 
risk includes both default risk and recovery risk. The most common assumption that is made 
when analyzing credit risk is that the recovery rates are known with certainty and thus the 
analysis focus on determining the probability of default.  
Recovery rates are assumed to be constant based on historical average between 40% and 50% 
on debt issued by U.S. corporate borrowers (Das & Hanouna, 2009). Some researchers 
(Longstaff & Schwartz, 1995) argued that since the recovery rate is the outcome of bargaining 
processes between debtors and creditors, and for that reason it is unsystematic and should not 
be modeled.  
According to (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006) credit risk models assume recovery rates to be 
dependent on individual features such as (collateral and seniority) and these features do not 
represent the systematic factor and should be independent of probability of default. Some 
researchers found that when default probabilities and recoveries are assumed to be 
uncorrelated the potential losses are understated by roughly 30%.(Altman, Brady, Resti, & 
Sironi, 2005)  
Is there variation in recovery rates? Research has shown that there is considerable variation in 
recovery rates across different types of debt instruments, and industry types, and that recovery 
rates are systematically related to business cycles. (Mora, 2012) 
The histogram below (Figure 5) shows that Moody’s Default Risk Service distribution of 
recovery rates varies across different debt instruments based on trading price recoveries 
calculated 30 days after the credit even on the defaulted debt instruments over the period of 
40 years.   
Average recoveries are 39% and have a standard deviation of 29%. The histogram also shows 
that sometime recoveries are more than 100% it happens when the coupon rate on the bond is 
much higher than the current term structure. 
23 
 
 
Figure 5: Histogram of recoveries rates based on Moody's DRS 1970-2008 cited in (Mora, 2012) 
Seniority of debt claim, industry type and also collateral determines the recovery rates for the 
creditors. An average recovery among different industry sectors varies from 25% to 58%. For 
example, recovery rates for the period 1970-2008 in the utility sector are, 58% which is 19% 
higher than the mean recovery rate of 39.3%.   
It is argued that Utilities have higher recovery rate because they are monopolies and have 
substantial tangible assets. Their many tangible assets and monopoly position in most 
countries give them the opportunity to charge higher prices, which is why there are higher 
recovery rates in this sector compared to other sectors.   
 
Figure 6: Recoveries rates by industry type source Moody's cited in(Mora, 2012) 
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The type of debt instrument and its seniority also determines the recovery rate, which 
creditors are going to realize. For example senior secured securities average recoveries were 
64% during the period 1987-20107 compared to 49% for Senior unsecured, this highlights the 
importance of collateral. The table below shows that, the higher the claim is in the capital 
structure according to APR, the higher the recovery rate in case of a default. 
 
Figure 7:  Average Corporate Debt Recovery Rates Measured by Ultimate Recoveries, 1987-2010 (Moody's, 2011) 
Different types of defaults such as voluntary out of court reorganization, reorganization under 
insolvency proceeding (chapter 11 in U.S.) and liquidation (chapter 7 in U.S.) can result in 
different recovery rates.  
Distress exchanges  where the creditors hold negotiations out of court and accept to lower the 
coupon rate, or lowering the debt par value  have higher recovery rates than under the 
bankruptcy proceeding. (Franks & Torous, 1994) 
 
Figure 8: 2010 Recovery Rates: Distressed Exchanges vs. Non-Distressed Exchanges (Moody's, 2011) 
Insolvency proceedings across different countries can also contribute to recovery rates 
because of the legal systems can give different creditor powers to influence the outcome of 
                                                 
7 Observation from Moody’s some of 2009 and 2010 defaults are not included in the ultimate recovery rate 
calculation because some companies have not emerged from defaults.  
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the negotiations. Some countries are termed as creditor friendly and others as debtor friendly. 
(Davydenko & Franks., 2008) has found that median recoveries rate in United Kingdom is 
92%, 67% in Germany and 56% France.  
Creditors’ recovery rate is also pro-cyclical, meaning the aggregate recovery follows the ups 
and downs of business cycles. Studies have found positive correlation between real GDP 
growth and recovery rates, and where recessions depress bond recoveries by up to one third 
from normal year averages. (Frye, 2000; Mora, 2012; Schuermann, 2004) 
 
Figure 9: The recovery rate and the business cycle adopted from (Mora, 2012) 
The reasons for the lower recovery rates during recessions or economic downturns is that only 
hedge funds and vulture investors are willing to invest in distress debt, and when there is a 
higher supply of defaulted debt in the market the capacity of these investors is limited and that 
leads to lower recovery rates.  
Illiquidity for the defaulted firms’ real assets can also affect recovery rates for the creditors, 
and key reason for this is industry distress. The distressed situation can force the firm to have 
a fire sale of the assets which will lead to dislocated price. This price is dislocated because the 
industry peers cannot bid the price up to the value that reflects the true value of the assets 
because the whole industry is in financially distress (Mora, 2012). The classic example is the 
sale of aeroplanes by financially distress airlines, where the prices of aeroplanes are highly 
related to airline industry.  
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4.1.8. Absolute Priority Rule (APR): 
When the debtor firm is insolvent absolute priority rule (APR) is applied to resolved financial 
contracts. In its simple form it states that the debtor (equity holders) receives no value by 
disposing the assets of the firm until all of the creditors have been paid in full and also senior 
creditors’ claim should be satisfied in full before junior creditors receive anything. Even 
though the APR rule seems very simple to implement but very hard to apply in practice for 
example (LoPucki & Whitford, 1990) argued that for a business with single owner and 
manager “ equity frequently dominates the bargain to such an extent that the absolute priority 
rule is virtually stood on its head” this could be because during the restructuring process 
lenders have to reduce the value of their debt payment to give an incentive by creating equity 
stake for owner-manager because of his/her expertise to run the business, which might be 
rare, so manager-owner obtain leverage in renegotiation process, which can lead to APR 
violation, in a sense that creditors’ claims are not paid in full and equity which has an most 
junior (residual) claim to the assets of the firm are paid. 
There is no consensus among academician about the source of APR deviation, some attribute 
it to the bankruptcy code and believe that these code provides implicit support for APR 
violation and whether these violations have positive and negative consequences. (Longhofer, 
1997) further argues that these deviations make two additional problems first they make 
default more likely, by increasing the interest rate that borrowers have to pay when they want 
to raise and secondly APR violations make credit rationing problem severe in a sense that 
lenders limits the supply of additional fund that borrowers need even though borrowers are 
willing to pay higher interest rate that will lead to market imperfection and equilibrium will 
not be achieved in the market.  
4.1.9. Order of priority of claims in Norway8: 
Distribution of funds of an insolvent firm in Norway is done as following: 
Costs of proceedings have the highest priority and must be covered before any other debt. 
Second priority is for secured claims, which are secured on the debtor’s assets. In case asset is 
mortgage for more than its value, the part that exceeds the assets value is considered as 
unsecured. Next in line are the employees’ claims for wages, leading up to the period of six 
months. After these claims have been fulfilled the proceeds of funds are distributed by the 
following rule. 
                                                 
8 This section is based on the report written by (Hansen, 2011) and (Brækus) 
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 Unpaid income tax; 
 Employees tax deduction; 
 Value added tax (VAT); and 
 National insurance payment. 
 Unsecured creditors 
 Postponed debt i.e. claims for accrued interest and donation promises made after the 
insolvency proceedings. 
 Shareholders.  
According to the Bankruptcy Act of 1984 the debt negotiations between insolvent debtor and 
its creditors to reach an agreement on reducing the debtor’s debt to a sustainable level in 
Norway can be reached by the following three stages.  
1. Out-of-court voluntary arrangement (frivillig gjeldsforhandling) in this type of 
arrangement in which creditors covered by the proposal must approve the agreement. 
If the proposal does not receive required voting by the creditors and some creditors 
abstain from voting then the second voting is held and in this if more than 75% of 
creditors (by amount outstanding) have consented to the proposal, then the proposal is 
adopted. 
2. Court-supervised voluntary arrangement (offfentlig gjeldsforhandling)  
3. Court-supervised compulsory arrangement (offentlig akkord) 
The first two stages are non-public, and the purpose of not making them public is that if these 
negotiations are made public, then debtor’s assets will plunge in value and then it will be 
difficult to reach an agreement to rescue the debtor’s business in some form. The debtor and 
creditors could not reach an agreement in first two stages then the transition to third stage 
must be made public. 
5. Research	Methodology	
Research methodology or simply method refer to the techniques and procedures used to 
obtain and analyze data (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). The choice of methodology 
forms the basis for evaluating the research, whether if it is conducted in a “scientific” manner 
or not. The main objective for the study is to calculate the present value of restructuring 
proposal and compare it with trading price of similar security to demonstrate that the creditors 
of distress firm got a better or worse deal. And to demonstrate that we used Lattice binomial 
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model to create interest rate on the lattice and then added spreads to the interest rate to 
computed the present value of bonds cash flows. In case of debt to equity swap we used 
nominal value of shares to calculate the value of share received as a result of restructuring. All 
the techniques and procedures used to evaluate the restructuring deal of distress firm will be 
described in detail below.  
5.1. The	Lattice	model9	
The complexity of bond valuation comes from the fact that cash flows of the bonds will 
depends on future interest rate. Practitioners and academician have come up with most elegant 
and complicated models to capture the uncertainty of future interest rate, but our choice of the 
model is lattice model in its simplest form and the we reduce to lattice to a binomial tree. In 
this thesis the focus is on the binomial model for interest rates and the models used to value 
fixed income securities with options imbedded in them, together with floating rate notes. The 
binomial model for the interest rate is a single factor model, the factor being the stationary 
variance and is in discreet time. 
The model can be visually represented in Figure 10 
    ݎସ 
   ࢘૜ ࢘૝ 
  ࢘૛ ࢘૜ ࢘૝ 
 ࢘૚ ࢘૛ ࢘૜ ࢘૝ 
ݎ଴ ࢘૚ ࢘૛ ࢘૜ ࢘૝ 
Figure 10: Single factor binominal model of interest rate 
ݎ଴….௡ ൌ Represents short rates in each period. The model assumes that there are only two 
possible states that ࢘૙ can become the next period in the “tree”. The period after that ࢘૚ can 
become three different rates. The model assumes that each so called state has a 50% 
probability to occur. The different states are called either down or up states so the tree can be 
presented as: 
                                                 
9 Section 5.1is based on (FABOZZI, 2002) 
29 
 
    ݎସ
ܷ, ܷ, ܷ, ܷ 
   ࢘૜
ܷ, ܷ, ܷ 
࢘૝
ܷ, ܷ, ܷ, ܦ 
  ࢘૛
ܷ, ܷ 
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࢘૝
ܷ, ܦ, ܦ, ܦ 
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࢘૛
ܦ, ܦ 
࢘૜
ܦ, ܦ, ܦ 
࢘૝
ܦ, ܦ, ܦ, ܦ 
Figure 11: Different states of the single factor binominal tree 
The difference from using the binomial model for interest rates as opposed to stocks is that 
first there are many models that are used to construct the binomial model, the one thing they 
have in common is that they all need to produce a value of an option less on-the-run issue. 
This means that the interest rate tree (the binomial tree) must produce the same price as the 
market, when this is done the model is considered arbitrage free and the model can be used 
for valuations. 
In the model each node has a relationship with the other nodes in its discreet time period. The 
relationship between the  ࢘૚௎௣ሺ௎ሻ  and 
࢘૚
஽௢௪௡ሺ஽ሻ  is such as ݎଵ,௎ ൌ ݎଵ,஽ ∗ ݁ଶఙ√௧  where σ is the 
stationary volatility, √ݐ is the square root of the time during the period between ࢘૙ and ࢘૚. 
The relationship between ࢘૛஽,஽, 
࢘૛
௎,஽ and 
࢘૛
௎,஽ are described as ݎଶ,௎,஽ ൌ ݎଶ,஽,஽ ∗ ݁ଶఙ√௧, and  ݎଶ,௎,௎ ൌ
ݎଶ,஽,஽ ∗ ݁ସఙ√௧. So in essence the relationship can be described as each column short rate are 
related to the bottom rate in the structure as  ݎ௔௕௢௩௘ ൌ ݎ௕௢௧௧௢௠ ∗ ݁௡ఙ√௧ where “n” is increased 
by “2” by each step up in the column, and a lognormal random walk are assumed. 
The next step is to set up a binomial tree with the value it measures 
    V(HHHH) 
   V(HHH) V(HHHL) 
  V(HH) V(HHL) V(HHLL) 
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 V(H) V(HL) V(HLL) V(HLLL) 
V V(L) V(LL) V(LLL) V(LLLL) 
Figure 12: value measurement in binomial tree 
Since the assumption is that the instrument pays a coupon that can be denote as “C”.  And 
there is also an assumption that the probability of the different states are equal, which means 
that in the column where we have V(H) and V(L) they have a probability of p=0.50 each of 
occurring. In the third column the probability of each node is p=(1/3) etc. 
To measure the value back at node “V” one must calculate recursively from the last column 
such as: 
ܸሺሺܪܪܪሻ ൌ 12 ቈ		
ܸሺܪܪܪܪሻ ൅ ܥ
൫1 ൅ ݎଷ,௎௎௎൯ ൅
ܸሺܪܪܪܮሻ ൅ ܥ
൫1 ൅ ݎଷ,௎௎௎൯ 	቉	 
This relationship goes for all the nodes in the model. 
When the binomial tree is set up and the relationships are in place, the next step is to calibrate 
it to the term structure, or more precise the par-yield curve. The most important condition of 
the binomial model is that it has no-arbitrage. To make sure that the model is arbitrage free it 
is needed to calibrate the model for the short rates by the “value-binomial tree”. To do that the 
thesis shows the process in a fictive way, where it is assumed the volatility, par yield and a 
short rate in the beginning of the process is known. 
 
Figure 13: Binominal model calibration 1 
The first short rate in the period are assumed to be 1%, the volatility 30% and the time period 
are equal in all the steps in the tree. It is also assumed that the par-yield of the term-structure 
(which is a Zero coupon) produces the different pay-offs visible. For one period a bondholder 
Volatility=0.30 B C D E F
12 =F16*exp(8*$A$11)
13 =E16*exp(4*$A$11) =F16*exp(6*$A$11)
14 =D16*exp(4*$A$11) =E16*exp(4*$A$11) =F16*exp(4*$A$11)
15 =C16*exp(2*$A$11) =D16*exp(2*$A$11) =E16*exp(2*$A$11) =F16*exp(4*$A$11)
16 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
17
18
19 104
20 =(0,5*(F19+F20))/(1+E13) 104
21 =(0,5*(E20+E21))/(1+D14) =(0,5*(F20+F21))/(1+E14) 104
22 =(0,5*(D21+D22))/(1+C15) =(0,5*(E21+E22))/(1+D15) =(0,5*(F21+F22))/(1+E15) 104
23 100 101 102 103 104
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receives 1%, for two 2% etc. To calibrate the tree begin with “locking in” the par yield payoff 
at column “D” at 102. 
 
Figure 14: Binominal model calibration 2 
Then use goal-seek in Excel (or trial and error) and set the cell “B23” as the “target cell”, 
induce the restriction that it will be 100, and that this is achieved by changing the cell “C16”. 
 
Figure 15: Binominal model calibration 3 
The next step is to “lock in” the value of 103 in column E. 
0,3 B C D
12
13
14 0,0332
15 0,0182 0,0182
16 0,0100 0,0100 0,0100
17
18
19
20
21 102,0000
22 100,1747 102,0000
23 99,5865 100,9901 102,0000
0,3 B C D
12
13
14 0,0332
15 0,0128 0,0182
16 0,0100 0,0070 0,0100
17
18
19
20
21 102,0000
22 100,7113 102,0000
23 100,0000 101,2887 102,0000
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Figure 2.2.4
 
Figure 16: Binominal model calibration 4 
 
Again use the function of goal seek and set “B23” as target cell, with the restriction that it 
shall be 100, by changing “D16” this time. 
 
Figure 17: Binominal model calibration 5 
This process continues through-out the binomial trees until he whole tree is calibrated to the 
par-yield.(FABOZZI, 2002) 
This binomial model will be used to value bonds in our sample. 
0,3 B C D E
12
13 0,0332
14 0,0332 0,0332
15 0,0128 0,0182 0,0182
16 0,0100 0,0070 0,0100 0,0100
17
18
19
20 103,0000
21 99,6902 103,0000
22 99,1547 101,1568 103,0000
23 99,0173 100,8602 101,9802 103,0000
0,3 B C D E
12
13 0,0332
14 0,0164 0,0332
15 0,0128 0,0090 0,0182
16 0,0100 0,0070 0,0049 0,0100
17
18
19
20 103,0000
21 101,3391 103,0000
22 100,4254 102,0818 103,0000
23 100,0000 101,5746 102,4940 103,0000
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5.2. Spreads10	
When an investor decides if he or she are willing to invest in a non-treasury debt security they 
first look at the ”base interest rate” which is also referred to as the ”benchmark interest rate”. 
It is a government treasury rate i.e. the treasury yield. (FABOZZI & MANN, 2005) 
A common base rate is the US governments which are seen as default free, but an investor can 
use another government yield curve, or benchmark curve that he or she feels comfortable 
with. 
The base interest rate is the minimum requirement that an investor would accept when 
investing, however depending upon risk factors such as default risk and liquidity risks market 
participants describe the rate they use to price/trade the non-treasury securities with as a 
premium/spread to the base interest rate. 
Pricing rate = Benchmark rate + Spread. 
The default risk is the risk that the borrower might not be able to pay the coupon or principal 
on the bond during and at the end of the term. 
The liquidity risk is the risk that the bondholder will sell the claim at below the true value due 
to the fact that there are not enough of buyers and sellers in the market for that particular 
security.   
There is vast research on the literature of liquidity and determining the asset price. There are 
two type of liquidity i.e. trading liquidity and market liquidity. Trading liquidity is how easily 
an investor can trade the asset/security in the market. Aswath Damadoran explains it as cost 
of investor’s remorse, i.e. it is the cost of reversing an asset trade almost instantaneously after 
you make the trade. 
The investors need for liquidity could be derived from the fact that he/she wants to change 
his/hers portfolio choices/weights, or it could be because of cash flow considerations.  
The other type of liquidity is fund liquidity which is linked to market’s fund. Meaning how 
easily an investor can obtain funds. This type of liquidity becomes very important particularly 
during the crisis time. 
                                                 
10 Section 5.2 is based on (FABOZZI & MANN, 2005) 
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Illiquidity is just the opposite of various frictions and impediments that hamper the trading of 
an asset or security or procurement of funds(Hibbert, Kirchner, Kretzschmar, Li, & McNeil, 
2009).  
The thesis is concerned with both types of illiquidity because once the firm is in distress then  
it will be hard for the bondholders to sell their securities in the market, since when there is 
many defaults there might not be enough funds available to buy distressed securities.  
There is a larger debate among academicians for the actual existence of liquidity premium or 
not, however there has been much empirical research that found that the liquidity premium is 
no myth and it is real and measurable. One such research carried by (Dick-Nielsen, 
Feldhütter, & Lando, 2011) which investigated corporate bond liquidity before and after the 
subprime mortgage crisis found out that during the subprime mortgage crisis corporate bond 
spreads increased and market liquidity had and extra  effect, which helped in widening the 
spread. They concluded that for CCC rated bonds/high yield bonds the spread for illiquidity 
are on average 420bp(basis points).(Hibbert, 2009) 
Credit risk in default can be measured with the formula 
Credit risk/Premium = Probability of default * Loss given default 
Or 
Credit risk/Premium = Probability of default * (1-Recovery rate) 
So when determining which spread to use in a valuation of the cash flows from a bond, the 
investor needs to first decide on a fitting benchmark interest rate, which usually is a 
government yield curve. Then determine the credit risk from default, and the liquidity spread 
Spread = Premium for default risk + liquidity premium 
Then ad that spread to the appropriate benchmark rate to value the cash flows from the 
instrument that is being valued. 
5.3. Probability	 of	 Default	 (PD),	 Loss	 Given	 Default	 (LGD)	 and	 Recovery	
Rate	(RR)	
Probability of default (PD) and Loss Given Default (LGD: which is simply one minus the 
recovery rate) are the two main variables that affect the credit risk of a financial asset. 
Significant focus has been devoted to the estimating the probability of default for the reason 
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that credit risk model are concerned with the systematic risk and traditionally it is assumed the 
Recovery Rate (RR) is dependent on individual factors such as collateral and seniority of 
claim.(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006) 
Early credit risk models were based on (Merton, 1974) in which risk of default is linked with 
the value of firm’s assets. Basic intuition behind this model was that default occurs when the 
value of firm’s assets are less then it liabilities (insolvency) and payoff of debt holder at the 
maturity is the minimum of face value of debt or market value of firm’s assets. In Merton’s 
theoretical framework PD and RR is inversely related. If for example, the firm’s value 
increases, then its PD tends to decrease while expected RR at default increases, while on the 
other side if firm’s debt increases it PD increases and expected RR decreases (Altman & 
Hotchkiss, 2006).  
To make the matter for calculating RR simple, (Longstaff & Schwartz, 1995) argued that 
historical defaults rates and RR of different classes of debt of comparable firms are reliable 
estimate of RR. This research took the same approach when calculating the PD and RR, the 
research used Moody’s average cumulative probabilities of default table (1970-2009) and 
calculated conditional default probabilities and used average historical RR of different classes 
of bonds as an input for LGD to get the spread for discounting  
ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ ൌ ܲݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݋݂	ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ∗ ܮ݋ݏݏ	ܩ݅ݒ݁݊	ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ 
ܮ݋ݏݏ	ܩ݅ݒ݁݊	ܦ݂݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ൌ ሺ1 െ ܴ݁ܿ݋ݒ݁ݎݕ	ܴܽݐ݁ሻ 
5.4. Default	Probabilities	and	Hazard	Rates:11	
Different rating agencies produce such as Moody’s, Fitch and Standard and Poor’s produce 
corporate bond rating to illustrate credit worthiness of the bonds. These rating agencies also 
produce default probabilities, which means how likely it is that the bonds in different rating 
categories will default at the end of a particular period. For example from the table below we 
can see that a bond rated Caa-C has a probability of default of 17.723 percent during the first 
year and 29.384 during the second period. We can calculate the probability of default of that 
Caa-C rated bond will default during year two is as following, probability of default at the end 
of year two minus the probability of default at the end of year one ( 29.384%-17.723%= 
11.661% ). So the probability of default that a Caa-C rated bond will default during year 2 is 
                                                 
11 Default probabilities table and hazard rate calculation is based on (Hull, 2012). 
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11.661 percent. This is called unconditional probability of default, meaning seeing from the 
time zero it is the probability that a Caa-C rated bond will default during year two. 
In the thesis the authors have worked with conditional probability of default in valuing the 
restructuring deal. Conditional probability of default is the probability of default base on no 
earlier default.  It is calculated as following. Now we know that unconditional probability of 
default for Caa-C rated bond during year two is 11.661 percent. We know that probability that 
a Caa-C rated bond will survive at the end of year one is (100%-17.723%= 82.277%). So the 
probability that a Caa-C rated bond defaulting during the second year conditioned on no early 
default would be (11.661% ÷ 82.277%= 14.172%). The conditional probability of default is 
also referred to as hazard rate or default intensities.  
From the Table 1 it is evident that probability of default at the end of a year is an increasing 
function of time, meaning Aaa-A rated bond will be considered creditworthy initially but their 
creditworthiness will decline as time passes. For instance the probability of A rated bond 
defaulting in years 0-5. 5-10 and 10-15 are 0.105%, 0.392% and 0.43% respectively. But on 
the other hand for the below investment grade the probability of default is an decreasing 
function of time, meaning for the Caa-C rated bonds first two or three years are more critical 
and if they survive that period then chances are their financial health has improved.  The 
probability of Caa-C rated bond defaulting in years 0-5. 5-10, 10-15 and 15-20 are 34.563%, 
19.09%, 6.196% and 2.666% respectively. 
 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 7 10 15 20 
Aaa-AAA 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.037 0.105 0.245 0.497 0.927 1.102 
Caa-C 17.723 29.384 38.682 46.094 52.286 59.771 71.376 77.545 80.211 
Table 1: Average cumulative default rate (%) 1970-2009: Source Moody's printed in (Hull, 2012) 
After calculating the conditional probability of default for Caa-C rated bond we used table in 
(Moody's, 2011) to get average recovery rate for the same type (seniority) of bond during that 
year and calculated Loss Given Default by the Following Formula.  
Loss	Given	Default ൌ ሺ1 െ Recovery	Rateሻ 
For example, average recoveries for senior secured bonds for 2009 according to table used 
from (Moody's, 2011) is  62.5 % so the LGD will be (1-62.5%= 37.5%). Now we have PD 
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and LGD to calculate the spread to be used to discount the value to time zero from year 2 
using the following formula. 
Spread ൌ Probability	of	Default ∗ Loss	Given	Default 
Spread ൌ ሺ14.172% ∗ 37.5%ሻ ൌ 5.31% 
So to discount the values to time zero we added the (default) and liquidity spread to 
Norwegian zero curve (benchmark rate) 
Discount	Rate ൌ Norwegian	Zero	Curve ൅ Default	Spread ൅ Liquiditiy	spread 
5.5. Liquidity	Spread	
There is vast research on liquidity premium/discount in literature to determine asset price. 
There are two type of liquidity i.e. trading liquidity and market liquidity. Trading liquidity 
which is with how ease and investor can trade asset/security in the market. Aswath 
Damadoran explains it as cost of investor’s remorse, i.e. it is the cost of reversing an asset 
trade almost instantaneously after you make the trade. Investor need for liquidity could be 
he/she want to change his portfolio choices or could be because of cash flow consideration. 
The other type of liquidity is market or fund liquidity which is linked to market’s fund and 
with how much ease an investor can obtain fund this type of liquidity becomes very important 
particularly during the crisis time. Illiquidity is just the opposite of various frictions and 
impediments that hamper the trading of an asset or security or procurement of funds(Hibbert, 
et al., 2009). We are concerned with both types because once firm is in distress then then it 
will be hard for the bondholder to sell his/her securities in the market with the ease and since 
when there is lot of default maybe there is not enough fund available to buy distress securities.  
(Dick-Nielsen, et al., 2011) concluded that for CCC rated bonds the liquidity premium 
increased by 420 basis points during the subprime mortgage. We used this liquidity premium 
in our calculation and added this to discount rate when we calculated the present value of the 
bonds cash flows. 
5.6. Equity	Valuation	
It is difficult to explain what actually happens to firm value when the borrowers are in 
financial distress by accounting standards (GAAP). In standard accounting, the assets and 
liabilities sides always balances, but no accountant, finance professor or investor would ever 
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seriously argue that the accounting presentation of the firm by accounting standards represent 
economic reality (Moyer, 2005) 
There are two approaches to present the size of the firm’s assets, liabilities and equity. One is 
by the General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) approach, in which the total assets of 
the company are equal to its total liabilities and equity. The other is the market approach 
which uses the trading values of the firm’s securities (debt and equity) to determine the size of 
its liabilities and equity.  
By determining the size of the liabilities and equity, the size of the assets will be determined, 
which is in contrast to the GAAP presentation of the firm, where equity value will adjust to 
balance the equation i.e. assets= liabilities+ equity. In the market approach it is assumed that 
the liabilities market value is equal to its principal amount as long as equity is positive. The 
strongest argument in favor of the market approach is derived from the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMT) which states that “market is always correct” and that the stock price is the 
collective market valuation of the firm’s equity by investors who have carefully analyzed all 
public information about the firm to arrive at this collective valuation. So the size of equity is 
known by this collective valuation and also the liabilities size, so the accounting equation 
becomes Equity= Assets-Liabilities. This way it becomes easier to find the value of the assets 
by the new equation.  
These two approaches can be better understood by the following graphical presentation of the 
size of the boxes of assets, liabilities and equity. For example if the value of firm’s assets is 
100 and 50 is the debt then according to GAAP, equity value will be 50. The market approach 
explain the sizes as if the company has 50 shares outstanding and they are trading at 1 per 
share then the market value of equity would be 50, and the debt is in principal 50, and traded 
at the face value, so the value of the firm’s assets will be 100.  
Now this becomes problematic with the market approach during financial distress. Suppose 
that at the time of distress the firm’s equity is trading at 2 so now the equity value will be 100 
and debt or liabilities are still priced at 50, so the firm’s assets will have a value of 150. Does 
this mean the firm’s assets value increased? Not exactly that is why the market value of equity 
for a financially distressed firm becomes fairly meaningless (Moyer, 2005).   
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            Amount  Price  Value 
Cash  20  Liabilities 50    Liabilities 50  100%  50 
Tangible Assets  80  Equity  50    Equity  50  1  50 
Total  100    100    Total      100 
Table 2: Market vs. GAAP presentation of balance sheet 1 
    
The description above is the case where market value equals GAAP value. Now consider that 
the firm wants to raise capital and the firm management believes that the market is fairly 
valuing its equity, and they issue 10 new shares at $1.5 per share. To simplify, assume that the 
market is optimistic about the future of the firm and chooses to value the firm’s stocks higher 
than the book value. There could be many different reasons why market value of the firm’s 
stocks are larger than the book value of the shares, however it is trivial to discuss that subject 
here, because the point here is to explain why the market valuation approach to value the 
firm’s assets is not appropriate during financial distress.  
According to GAAP this transaction will be depicted in the following way.  The firm’s asset 
value will increase by (10*1.5=15), and equity will be increase in by the same amount. On the 
market side however  the equity value will increase to (60*1.5= 90) because now there are in 
total 60 shares outstanding  and the value of each share is $1.5 so the equity value will be 90 
and liabilities will still be the same at 50, so the firm’s asset value will now be 140. 
 
 
Market Approach 
Equity= 50 
Liabilities= 50 
Assets= 100
GAAP Approach 
Liabilities= 50 
Assets= 100 
Equity= 50 
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            Amount  Price  Value 
Cash  35  Liabilities 50    Liabilities 50  100%  50 
Tangible Assets  80  Equity  65    Equity  60  1.5  90 
Total  110    110    Total      140 
Table 3: Market vs. GAAP presentation of balance sheet 2 
Assume that the market is not so optimistic about the firms’ future and value each share at 15 
cents and the debt now are trading at 50% of par value. What the market can give, it can take 
away, as we have seen in the case of “NASDAQ12 Composite” during the dot-com bubble and 
financial crisis of 2007. During the dot-com bubble NASDAQ dropped from the peak of 
5,132.52 to 1,108.49 during two and half year of the crisis started on 10 March 2000. During 
the 2007 financial crisis NASDAQ on the October 9th, 2007 closed at 2,800 and dropped to 
2,300 by February the 6th, 2008. The description below shows that there will be no change to 
the value under the GAAP approach because the market values are irrelevant under that 
approach, however in the market approach, since the debt is trading at a significant discount 
the equity value will be ignored because of the fact that equity is junior to the debt claim, and 
the debt holders have to recover their values first, and after recovering their value, if there is 
some value left it would be given to the shareholders as the residual value.  
 
                                                 
12  NASDAQ Composite consists of 3000 components and it is highly followed as an indicator of the 
performance of stocks. 
Market Approach 
Equity= 90 
Liabilities= 50 
Assets= 140 
GAAP Approach 
Liabilities= 50 
Assets= 115 
Equity= 65 
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            Amount  Price  Value 
Cash  35  Liabilities 50    Liabilities 50  50%  25 
Tangible Assets  80  Equity  65    Equity  60  0  0 
Total  110    110    Total      25 
Table 4: Market vs. GAAP presentation of balance sheet 3 
There is an interesting observation here; if the stocks are trading at 15 cents which is a 
positive value does it not mean that the firm’s debt would be receiving 100% recoveries on 
their claims? Because equity should receive any only after the creditors’ claims has been 
“fully” satisfied (since equity is junior in its claims). Having a positive value of equity can 
indicate full recoveries for the firms’ creditors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assets 
 
25 
 
Liabilities 
 
50 
Net Equity  25  Equity  0 
Total  50    50 
Table 5: Market presentation of balance sheet in financial distress 
Market Approach 
Assets= 25 Liabilities= 25 
GAAP Approach 
Liabilities= 50 
Assets= 115 
Equity= 65 
Market Approach during Financial Distess 
Assets= 25 
Liabilities= 50 
Neg. Equity= 25 
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This is the problem with the market approach in distress, since the firms’ liabilities are more 
than the asset value of the firm. Because of this problem it is customary to use the nominal 
value of the shares to value financially distressed firms rather than resorting to the market 
value of the equity. 
In a distressed situation the value of the assets are much more important, because they are 
going to dictate how much will be available to satisfy the creditors’ claims, and if any residual 
value will be handed over to the equity holders.  
Using the book values is a way to value the equity in a distressed situation, it may not be the 
perfect solution however it is a good approximation that should be utilized instead of using 
the market value of equity. Because from the example above, the market value of equity 
becomes fairly meaningless in a financial distressed situations according to Moyer. (Moyer, 
2005) 
6. Abnormal	Return	Measurement:	
In the thesis a special measurement is used that we dubbed as “abnormal return”13  for 
bondholder, the abnormal return is nothing more than the difference between trading price of 
security after default as percentage of amount outstanding of same seniority class of the bonds 
and the ultimate recovery as percentage of amount outstanding of the proposal. It is used in 
the thesis for measuring how much better/worse off the creditors are by accepting the 
restructuring proposal than if they sell their security on the market and get trading price base 
returns. It is presumably same as ultimate recovery, but since ultimate recovery is always 
positive, abnormal returns can take on negative values, indicating that creditors have received 
a worse proposal than they should have got through trading price recovery.  
ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ݏ ൌ ሺ ݌ݎ݋݌݋ݏ݈ܽ	ݒ݈ܽݑܱ݁ݑݐݏݐܽ݊݀݅݊݃	ܽ݉݋ݑ݊ݐሻ െ ሺ
ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁	݋݂	ݏ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐݕ	ܽݐ	݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ
ܱݑݐݏݐܽ݊݀݅݊݃	ܽ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ ሻ 
The reason for choosing the abnormal return terminology is it can be negative and positive indicating 
if the bondholders got better off in case of positive value or worse off in case of negative value, as 
compared to trading price returns.   
                                                 
13 We used the term “abnormal returns” differently than its traditional meaning in finance. To us it is the 
difference between ultimate returns (discounted value of cash flows plus equity value if any) of a security at 
default and its “expected” return. Expected returns as we considered are if at default bondholders sell their 
security on the market and get trading price returns.     
43 
 
7. Description	of	the	sample	
In Table 6 an overview of Stamdata database is presented. The table shows the amount 
outstanding in million Norwegian Kroners and Total number of tranche issued by industry 
type. It is clearly evident from the table that finance, public sector, energy and utility, oil and 
gas and shipping dominate in the Norwegian bond market both in volume and number.  
Industry  Volume 
 (mNok) 
Number of Bonds % of Total Volume  Average Tranche size 
(mNok) 
Finance  619 052  2267  34%  273 
Public Sector  561 034  787  30%  713 
Bank  376 177  442  20%  851 
Energy and Utility  77 645  222  4%  350 
Oil and Gas  75 022  92  4%  815 
Shipping  34 769  80  2%  435 
Industry  27 033  78  1%  347 
Property  20 309  53  1%  383 
Service  14 052  45  1%  312 
Transportation  10 134  40  1%  253 
Food and Beverages  8 301  29  0%  286 
Wholesale and Retail 7 810  24  0%  325 
Fishery  3 440  12  0%  287 
Media  3 135  9  0%  348 
Telecom/IT  2 580  9  0%  287 
Others  1 400  6  0%  233 
Total  1 841 893  4195  100%   
Table 6: Issued amount (mNOK) during 2012 by industry type source: Stamdata database as of 08/09/2012 
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Figure 18: Bar chart of issued amount (mNOK) during 2012 by industry type source: Stamdata database as of 
08/09/2012 
Our final sample comprises of 97 bonds, we sorted the sample by looking at Stamdata 
database and selecting companies that went through restructuring, and then we further sort out 
the sample by looking into the companies who went through restructuring due to financial 
distress, while other companies were excluded from the sample. 
 
Figure 19: Restructuring during the year 
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Figure 19 illustrates restructuring during each year from 2007-2012 and clearly show that half 
of restructuring occurred during 2009, this could be from the fact that due to financial crisis 
that hit the world which led to economic downturn all around the world. Most of our sample 
is from 2009 to 2011 with only few restructuring proposed during the rest of the year included 
in the sample  
Oil & Gas  Oil & Gas Services  Shipping  Mining  Others 
Aladdin Oil & Gas ASA  Bergen Group ASA  Aker American 
Shipping ASA  
Crew 
Gold Corp 
Blom ASA 
Artumas Group 
Inc/Wentworth Resources 
Bergen Oilfield Services AS  Belships ASA  Wega 
Mining 
AS 
Codfarmers ASA 
Malaka Oil AB  Bluestone Offshore Pte Ltd  Eitzen Chemical 
ASA 
  Krillsea Group 
ASA 
Nor Energy AS  Ceon ASA, Ceon AS1 & Ceon AS2  Eitzen Maritime 
Services ASA 
  Nattopharma 
ASA 
Norse Energy Corp ASA  Marine Accurate Well ASA ‐ 
MARACC 
Nexus Floating 
Production Ltd 
  Peterson AS 
Oren Oil/Saga Oil  Marine Subsea AS  Oceanlink Ltd    Tandberg Data‐
Storage ASA 
Front Exploration AS 
(Discover Petroleum AS 
Master Marine AS  Fairstar Heavy 
Transport NV 
   
Geysir Petroleum hf  Nordic Heavy lift ASA  Primorsk 
International LTd 
   
Proserv Group AS  Oceanteam Shipping 
ASA/Oceanteam Power&Umbilical 
ASA 
     
Interoil Exploration and 
Production ASA 
Petrolia ASA       
  Reservoir Exploration Technology 
ASA 
     
  Rowan Drilling Norway AS‐ Skeie 
Drilling ASA 
     
  Sevan Marine ASA       
  Transeuro Energy Corp       
  Scan Geophysical ASA       
  Valhalla Oil and Gas AS       
Total:       10  16  8  2  6 
Table 7: Sample classification by industry type 
Table 7 sorts out the sample by five broader industry types. Companies included in Oil and 
gas industry type are the ones that are directly related to oil and gas production and 
exploration. We distinguish oil and gas production from oil and gas services, and oil and gas 
services includes the companies that provided services to oil and gas exploration. The 
Norwegian market is dominated by the oil and gas and shipping companies, so that is why 
almost 62% of the sample consist of oil and gas related companies that were involved in 
restructuring and 20% of the companies that were involved in restructuring were related to 
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shipping. Companies that are not related to oil & gas, oil and gas services, shipping and 
mining are grouped as others.   
8. Sample	Analysis:	
8.1. Descriptive	Analysis	
Descriptive analysis of the sample has been done to analyze and presents the collective 
information about the abnormal return of the sample according to industry type, seniority of 
claim, and type of instrument used for distress exchange etc. the descriptive analysis is 
present in the form of table and graphs for the layman to understand how much abnormal 
returns are associated with different industry type, type of distress exchange instrument and 
seniority of claim. Although descriptive analysis only present significant features of the 
sample but it is a very effective tool to understand the trend in ultimate recovery associated 
with the types of bonds. A detailed regression analysis has also been done to analyze if the 
results obtain by descriptive analysis are significant or not.  
The Table 8 below illustrates our sample by industry type and by amount outstanding for the 
time period covered by the study. 63 percent in number of total bonds and 73 percent of total 
amount outstanding consist of bonds issued by companies related to either oil and gas 
production or providing services to oil and gas industry.   
Industry  Number of 
Bonds 
Percentage 
of  
Total Bonds 
Amount 
Outstanding 
(bnNOK) 
Percentage of  
Total Outstanding 
Oil & Gas  22  23%  4.15  13% 
Oil & Gas Services  39  40%  19.10  60% 
Shipping  15  15%  5.03  16% 
Mining  6  6%  2.18  7% 
Other  15  15%  1.55  5% 
Total  97  100%  32.01  100% 
Table 8: Sample description by industry and amount outstanding 
For the purpose of regression analysis we also divided our sample into convertible bonds and 
“regular”14 bonds and also in different type of interest rate structure i.e. fixed and floating 
rate. The table below illustrates that almost all of convertible bonds have fixed interest rate 
structure and only have one has a floating rate coupon rate, but “regular” bonds has 39 bonds 
which has floating rate interest rate structure and 30 bonds has fixed rate interest rate 
                                                 
14 All types of bonds e.g. with and without embedded options except for convertible bonds 
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structure. It is also evident from the table below that there is even split between floating rate 
and fixed rate coupon rate in our sample, but fixed rate dominated our sample.    
Interest Rate 
Structure 
“Regular” 
Bonds 
Convertible Total number 
of Bonds 
Percentage of  
Total Bonds 
Floating Rate  39  1  40  41% 
Fixed Rate  30  27  57  59% 
Table 9: sample description by bond types 
8.1.1. Descriptive Analysis of Sample’s “Ultimate” Returns:  
Figure 20 illustrates number of bonds in our sample that were involved in restructuring due to 
distress by their seniority claim. As well average recovery rate calculated by Moody’s for the 
period 1987-2010. Almost 44% of our sample consists of senior secured bonds and 40 percent 
consist of senior unsecured bonds. The bar graph illustrates the average ultimate recoveries 
for different seniority of bonds; also it clearly shows that senior secured bonds in our sample 
obtained ultimate recovery of 65% of their face value and senior unsecured obtaining slightly 
higher recoveries of 68%. Ultimate recoveries calculated for senior secured and senior 
unsecured in our sample are almost identical to the trading price recoveries calculated by 
Moody’s for the same seniority (Moody's, 2011). The number of the bonds in other categories 
is not large enough to make a sound judgment about average recoveries for those classes of 
bonds.  
 
Figure 20: Number of bonds in restructuring according to their seniority claim and their ultimate recoveries 
compared to Moody’s average recovery rate (1987-2010) 
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It is evidently clear from the graphs below (Figure 21) that ultimate recoveries for senior 
secured and senior unsecured bonds has increase since the onset of the financial crisis. An 
ultimate recovery for senior secured bonds from the modest 37 percent has risen to 69 percent 
in year 201l. Data for ultimate recoveries of senior secured bonds for 2007 and 2012 is 
deliberately excluded because of none or only one bond that got restructured in these years are 
present in our sample. Same can be said for senior unsecured bonds, whose ultimate 
recoveries has risen from modest of 23 percent in 2007 t0 92 percent in 2012.  
 
Figure 21: Ultimate recoveries of senior secured and senior unsecured bonds of the sample. 
The graph below (Figure 22) illustrates ultimate recoveries of senior secured and senior 
unsecured bonds side by side. It is evidently clear that senior unsecured bonds have earned 
better ultimate recoveries then their counterpart i.e. senior secured for all year included in the 
sample, with the exception of year 2009 where senior secured ultimate recoveries were higher 
than the senior unsecured bonds.  
 
Figure 22: Comparison of ultimate recoveries of senior secured and senior unsecured bonds 
From the pie chart below (Figure 23) it is evidently clear that almost of half of the 
restructuring for our sample has been done with debt exchange, 32 percent with debt-to-equity 
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swap and rest with a mixture of debt-to-equity and debt exchange. Debt exchange in the 
Norwegian bond restructuring is quite frequent then bankruptcy proceeding. This result 
coincide with (Moody's, 2011) which also has similar results, where debt exchange was only 
11% of defaults for the period 1970-2007 and then it really took off because of  number of 
reasons like unattractiveness of bankruptcy, lack of debtor in procession and exist financing. 
But between 2008 and 2010 the share of distress exchanges increased from 23 percent to 42 
percent.  
  
Figure 23: Distress Exchange by type and ultimate recoveries for debt-to-equity and debt exchange. 
An average recovery for debt-to-equity swap is at 55 percent for our sample. This ultimate 
recovery has been calculated using nominal value of share and not market stock price. That 
could be a reason for lower ultimate recovery, but bondholders choosing for debt-to-equity 
swap have an unlimited upside if the distressed company turns around because of better 
liquidity situation and less debt in its capital structure. On the other hand debt exchange 
average ultimate recoveries were 73 percent which are 33 percent higher than debt-to-equity 
swap  
The graph below (Figure 24) illustrates that average ultimate recoveries for the oil and gas 
sector (oil and gas production and exploration) has been quite high at 78% as compared to 
other industry type. The reason for this high ultimate recovery is that, 7 out of 22 bonds in oil 
and gas industry are senior secured, with an average ultimate recovery of 64 percent. Another 
reason for higher recoveries is that senior secured bonds have low probability of default 
which is a major input in calculating ultimate recoveries. Also this sample consists of 8 senior 
unsecured bonds, with an average ultimate recovery rate of 85 percent. Senior unsecured 
bonds have little high probability of default than senior secured but still significantly lower 
48%
32%
20%
Percentage of instrument used 
Debt
Exchange
Debt‐to‐
Equity
Mix
55%
73%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Debt‐to‐Equity Debt Exchange
Average returns by instrument
50 
 
than other type of bonds. All this factors have contributed to the higher recoveries for oil and 
gas sector. 
 
Figure 24: Average ultimate recoveries by industry type and number of bonds involved in restructuring. 
The graphs below (Figure 25) illustrate average ultimate recoveries for different industry type 
along with number of senior secured and senior unsecured bonds. It is clearly evident the 
higher the number of secured bonds the higher the recovery rates in the industry, for example, 
oil and gas industry has 8 senior secured bonds and their average recovery rates is 60 percent. 
But in the case of mining and shipping industry which only has 2 senior secured bonds each it 
could not been said the same for them. Higher average ultimate recoveries for the oil and gas, 
oil and gas services and hipping could be attributed to higher number of senior secured bonds, 
which were involved in restructuring.  
 
Figure 25: Average ultimate recoveries by industry type for senior secured bond along with number of bonds involved 
in restructuring 
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 In the graph blow it is evident that higher the number of senior unsecured bonds involved in 
restruturing, higher the recoveries rate in the industry type will be. Oil and gas industy has 12 
senior unsecured bonds and their ultimate recovery for senior unsecured bond is 90 percent, 
this is also one of the reason for higher ultimate recovery rate for the oil and gas services 
industry on the average. Same could be said for other type of industy in the sample.  
 
Figure 26: Average ultimate recoveries by industry type for senior unsecured bond along with number of bonds 
involved in restructuring 
It is clearly evident from the above graphs that presence of senior secured and senior 
unsecured bonds in restructuring give higher ultimate recovery rate, the main reason for this is 
that, the probability of default for senior secured and senior unsecured is very low as compare 
to other types of bonds, which is a key input in calculating ultimate recoveries.  
8.1.2. Descriptive Analysis of Sample’s “Abnormal” Returns:  
Figure 27 illustrates the abnormal returns for different types (seniority claim) of bonds; it is 
clearly evident that senior secured and senior unsecured bonds received high abnormal returns 
in our data sample.  
 
Figure 27: Average Abnormal Returns by Bond Seniority 
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The abnormal returns obtained by other type of bonds cannot be asserted with confidence 
because the number of bonds involved in the restructuring process was very low in number.  
 
Figure 28: Average abnormal returns by industry type 
Figure 28 depicts average abnormal returns associated with different type of industry. It is 
clearly evident that oil and gas, oil and gas services and shipping industries received higher 
abnormal returns. It is difficult to suggest that mining industry obtained negative abnormal 
returns in the restructuring process because only 6 bonds were in the sample. When an 
industry or bond received negative abnormal return, this means that they have accepted the 
deal in which they receive lower ultimate returns than getting trading price recovery.  
 
Figure 29: Average abnormal returns by distressed resolution instrument 
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Figure 29 display average abnormal returns by the type of distress resolution instrument, 
namely debt-to-equity swap, debt exchange and mix of both. The graph shows that creditors 
will have high (positive) abnormal returns if they are offered debt exchange during financial 
restructuring then debt to equity swap. Lower abnormal returns for debt-to-equity swap can be 
attributed to the valuation techniques used, where nominal value of shares is used to value the 
equity instead of trading price shares. The reason for using nominal value is that, most 
companies trading price were not available. As well distressed firm equity becomes a call 
option, but due to lack of data, it was valued suing nominal value than Black and Scholes 
option pricing model. The graph above suggests that creditors to receive higher value in 
restructuring than trading price recoveries should choose distressed resolution instruments in 
this order 1) debt exchange, 2) mix of debt-to-equity swap and debt exchange and 3) debt-to-
equity swap. 
8.1.3. Descriptive Analysis Conclusion: 
From descriptive point of view of the sample data, it can been noticed that sample is mostly 
composed of senior secured and senior unsecured bonds so the descriptive analysis regarding 
these two bonds will shed better light on them other bonds which are very few in number. 73 
percent of our sample consists of bonds that are related to oil and gas production and services 
firms, the reason for lot of bonds in this industry could be the financial crisis around the world 
which affected the industries all over the world and this can also confer that Norwegian 
economy is dominated by oil and gas related industry. 
Other conclusion that could be drawn from descriptive analysis is that senior unsecured bonds 
acquired better returns then senior secured bonds and also returns for both type of bonds have 
increase since 2008. Another interesting observation from the analysis is that except for year 
2008 senior unsecured on average obtain higher ultimate recoveries than senior secured 
bonds.  
Another observation that coincide with (Moody's, 2011) is that the distress exchange (either 
debt exchange or debt to equity swap) is popular among Norwegian creditors instead filing for 
bankruptcy filing. Also debt exchanges have on average has obtained higher returns than debt 
to equity almost 18% more.  
The most important observation from the sample comes from the fact that oil and gas 
production and exploration related companies obtained highest ultimate returns of 78%, this is 
because of two reasons, one most of the bonds in restructuring in our sample for the oil and 
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gas industry was senior secured bonds and other reason could be that these types of industries 
have large tangible assets so that could be the reason for higher returns for distressed 
bondholders.  
Another interesting observation is that the higher the number of senior secured and senior 
unsecured bonds, the higher their ultimate recoveries irrespective of industry type. From the 
graphs and tables the picture of seniority, security and industry appears to be the most 
significant factors determining ultimate recovery during the restructuring process, with this 
descriptive analysis it cannot be concluded with certainty because detailed regression tests 
need to be done to see if these results are statistical significant. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the descriptive analysis is distressed investors 
should hold bonds for oil and gas related industry and should opt for debt exchange during 
financial restructuring negotiations to receive higher return than trading price returns. 
The next part of the analysis will examine the sample in more depth and with more efficient 
tools to see if a relationship and its magnitude can be determined. 
8.2. Regression	Analysis:	
In this regression analysis we have tried to answer our research questions with the help of 
econometrics. The first question/hypothesis was that the bondholders should always receive 
positive “abnormal returns” from financial restructuring or in other words they only accept 
financial restructuring when their returns are higher as compared to if they sell their bond in 
the market.  This was not the case as in 30% of our cases bondholders had negative abnormal 
return. 
Another hypothesis is that during financial restructuring Absolute Priority Rule is upheld 
could not be refuted but there were a few outliners where we had deviations from APR, 
however on the larger scale we cannot say that APR was violated in our sample. Also the 
regression analysis did not provided that seniority of the bonds was a significant variable to 
estimate abnormal returns. But regression did find that industry and the type of proposal (debt 
exchange or debt to equity swap) given and executed were significant variables to estimate 
abnormal returns. 
8.2.1. Test of Hypotheses  
There were 97 bonds in our sample that went through financial restructurings, 25 of those 
bondholders received negative abnormal returns, which imply that in about 26% of the cases 
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the bondholders would have on average been better off if they would have sold their claim in 
the market. The reason for that could include that there is not enough distress investors in the 
market to buy their claim and also that there are not enough distress investing funds available 
in the market so bondholders accept the restructuring deal and agree to receive lower returns. 
Other reasons could be that bondholders are very experienced investors and backed up by the 
financial advisor and on their advice they might think that holding on to the restructuring deal 
they can maximize their return in the future, for example in the case of debt to equity swaps 
they might have valued the equity to be of much higher valued in the future so they accept the 
deal in the hope that a small loss now can turn into huge returns in the future. Also sometime 
Norsk Tillitsmann provided bondholders with their expert opinion about the restructuring 
whether it is a good deal or not and whether bondholders should evaluate the deal on to their 
own and by their advisors.  
The range of abnormal returns varied a lot in our sample, the highest abnormal return was at 
135% (in Rowan Drilling Norway) and the lowest was at -58.4% (in Krillsea Group ASA). 
The graph below (Figure 30) clearly indicates that abnormal returns for the distress 
bondholders vary a lot. 
  
Figure 30: graph of sample abnormal returns 
We also observed if there was any particular industry type that receives negative abnormal 
return but there was no industry that stood out in our sample which can be clearly seen from 
the table blow. 
Industry Type Number of Negative Abnormal Returns 
Oil and Gas 4 
‐1.000
‐0.500
0.000
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1.000
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Abnormal returns
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Oil and Gas Services 5 
Shipping 4 
Mining 6 
Others 6 
Total 25 
Table 10: negative abnormal returns by industry 
We performed multiple linear regressions on two models to find out if abnormal returns are 
significantly affected by the type of restructuring instrument, type of bond, bond seniority, 
time in restructuring, time to maturity, industry type or ownership percentage after debt to 
equity swap. We started the regression analysis by deciding to use abnormal return as the 
dependent variables, and the following as the independent: 
Independent Variable Type Reason Significance 
Fixed Coupon Dummy Interest structure Not proven 
Senior  Dummy Priority oriented Not proven 
Secured Dummy Collateral Not proven 
Debt Exchange  Dummy Type of restructuring Yes 
Debt to Equity Swaps  Dummy Type of restructuring Not proven 
Ownership percentage after a D2E Quantitative Take-over Not proven 
Outstanding amount Quantitative Size Not proven 
Oil & Gas Dummy Industry Yes 
Oil & Gas Services Dummy Industry Yes 
Shipping Dummy Industry Not proven 
Mining Dummy Industry Not proven 
Other Dummy Industry Not proven 
Time to Maturity Quantitative Stress factor Not proven 
Gearing Quantitative Debt load Not proven 
Time in restructuring Quantitative Stress factor Not proven 
 
Table 11: list of independent variables used in regression 
The regression analysis was performed in steps. In the first step we decided to test above 
listed independent variables whether they have a significant relationship to abnormal returns. 
For that purpose we used a multiple linear regression model with the above listed variables , 
we decided that variables that produced coefficients around 0.10 in p-values will be kept for 
further regression analysis and the ones with much higher p-values would be trimmed off. 
 Because higher p-value would mean that there is no significant relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables, or in more simple words the above listed independent 
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variables do not have any relationship with abnormal returns. The reason for not being very 
strict with the required significance level of 0.10 was that some independent variables may 
produce disturbance in the model and make significant variables seem insignificant. As an 
example, the variable for debt exchanges would have been discarded early if we hadn’t 
provided the models with some slack in the trimming phase, because in the first and second 
regression tests where all independent variables were present, debt exchanges did not pass the 
0.05 criterion. And if we hadn’t used the rule of keeping the ones with p-values close to but 
not limited and discarded if somewhat higher than 0.10 a variable such as D2D would have 
been cut, and that would have been wrong since we can see that it in fact are relevant and 
significant, it was the "disturbance" from the other variables that in the beginning made it 
appear un-significant. 
We also performed the regression tests by cutting the sample for the independent variable 
“gearing” to 71 observations. This was done because there was no information available to us 
regarding all companies gearing. That meant that we did use one sample of 97 observations 
that we called “without” gearing”, and a sample with 71 observations where we had cut the 
companies we could not find out the gearing from. We then worked the sample and received 
two models one including gearing, and one without. We then trimmed the obviously 
insignificant independent variables from the model and repeated the process of trimming the 
independent variables up to three times, until we were satisfied that we had only significant 
independent variables in the models. We had our final models where we set the required p-
value of 0.05 to consider the coefficients significant. Usually in research there are three levels 
of significance in the p-values used 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10. We decided that 0.05 would be 
acceptable as the required significance for a final model.  
Independent Variables Type Required significance p‐value  Significant 
Debt exchange (D2D) Dummy 0.05 0.0051  Yes. Reject 
H0 
Oil & Gas Dummy 0.05 0.0001  Yes. Reject 
H0 
Oil & Gas Services Dummy 0.05 0.0015  Yes. Reject 
H0 
H0: No relationship 
H1: Relationship 
Abnormal Return =  - 0.074 + 0.202*D2D + 0.378*Oil & Gas + 0.258*Oil & Gas Services + e 
Table 12: Multiple linear regression Abnormal Return (No Gearing) 
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Multiple linear regression Abnormal Return (gearing)      
Variables Type Required significance p‐value  Significant 
Oil & Gas Dummy 0.05 0.0004  Yes. Reject 
H0 
Oil & Gas Services Dummy 0.05 0.0453  Yes. Reject 
H0 
      
H0: No relationship 
H1: Relationship 
Abnormal Return =  0.124 + 0.403*Oil & Gas + 0.183*Oil & Gas Services + e 
Table 13: Multiple linear regression Abnormal Return (with gearing) 
Table 13 shows p-values of the final regression models. The two models displayed are of the 
abnormal returns. Both final models seems to first indicate that the industries “Oil & Gas, and 
Oil & Gas Services” both have a significant positive relationship that is positive with 
abnormal returns in restructurings. If the distressed bond is issued by an Oil & Gas industry 
firm then in financial restructuring the abnormal return seems to increase by almost 40%. The 
second noticeable point is that the type of restructuring performed is also important. This can 
however not be seen in the second model for abnormal return when gearing has been allowed 
in to the sample, and the sample have been reduced down to 71 observations. If the distressed 
bond during financial restructuring receives a debt exchange then bondholder’s abnormal 
returns will increase by 20%. The final take away from the model is if a distressed bond is 
neither issued by Oil and Gas related industries nor receive a debt exchange in financial 
restructuring then it is better for the bondholders to sell off their bond in a market and receive 
trading price recoveries. That is easier said than done because it is conditioned on different 
factors as mentioned above, distress investing funds, market liquidity and future prospect of 
the restructuring deal perceived by bondholders based either or Norsk Tillitsmann or their 
financial advisors.   
Regression Statistics for 
Abnormal returns (no gearing) 
R-Square 0.1924
Adj. R-Square 0.1664
P-Value of F 0.0002
Regression Statistics for 
Abnormal returns (with gearing) 
R-Square 0.1701
Adj. R-Square 0.1457
P-Value of F 0.0017
Table 14: Regression Statistics with and without gearing 
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The R² and adj-R² from the models gives us an explanatory power of the regression model, for 
the abnormal return we seems to only be able to explain about 20% and 17% of the variance. 
But before any statistical inference can be done, and the model could possibly be used for any 
actual predictions, it needed to be tested that it is a good fitted model without bias.  
8.2.2. Test of the model 
The models we produced appear to have some explanatory power, and significant independent 
variables. However before any statistical inference can be made and the model would be 
suitable to test for prediction power and confidence intervals for the coefficients we 
performed some tests to see if the model meets the BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) 
criteria and could be used for statistical inference. To be considered BLUE the model has to 
fulfill certain criteria: these criteria includes that the residuals cannot be heteroscedastic, auto-
correlated or distributed “non-normally” around their mean and the model cannot be 
misspecified either. 
We ran some tests to check for normality, homoscedasticity and model misspecification. In 
the tests, if the obtained statistic was larger than the critical values the “null-hypotheses” was 
rejected. 
Normality, Homoscedasticity & Misspecification Abnormal Returns (no 
gearing) 
Test Critical value Obtained Accept/Reject 
H0
Jarque-Bera* 5.991 19.182 Reject 
Brusch-Pagan** 7.815 1.822 Accept 
Ramsey RESET*** 3.097 0.182 Accept 
* Normality of residuals. H0: Normality, H1: Not normally distributed 
** Homoscedasticity, H0: Homoscedastic, H1: Heteroscedastic 
*** Model misspecification H0: No misspecification, H1: Misspecified 
Normality, Homoscedasticity & Misspecification Abnormal Returns (with 
gearing) 
Test Critical value Obtained Accept/Reject 
H0
Jarque-Bera* 5.991 12.083 Reject 
Brusch-Pagan** 5.991 1.343 Accept 
Ramsey RESET*** 3.136 0.000 Accept 
* Normality of residuals. H0: Normality, H1: Not normally distributed 
** Homoscedasticity, H0: Homoscedastic, H1: Heteroscedastic 
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*** Model misspecification H0: No misspecification, H1: Misspecified 
Table 15: Results to test if model fulfills BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) criteria 
The Jarque-Bera test confirms that the residuals are not normally distributed the disbursement 
around zero for the residuals can be seen below in the histograms of each model. 
  
 
Figure 31: Histogram of standardized Residuals 
If the residuals/error terms of the model are not considered normally distributed, the model 
cannot be used for statistical inference, so we cannot use our model for statistical inference.  
The residuals could not be said to be heteroscedastic in any of the models according to the 
Brusch-Pagan test. The test are administered for its simplicity, where only an auxiliary 
regression is made and a LM-multiplier is calculated and compared to a critical value. If the 
model does not show itself homoscedastic in the residuals, then the error terms do not have 
the same dispersion and the model cannot be used for statistical inference. 
None of the models appear in fact to be considered misspecified according to the RESET test 
which is important to attain the property of BLUE. 
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The last test we ran was the Durbin-Watson test to check for autocorrelation. There is a clear 
misconception regarding autocorrelation, that it is only apparent in time series data. This is 
not the case. In fact the reason for the misconception might be that it goes under another name 
in cross sectional data spatial correlation.15 It is however almost the same thing. 
In our data testing for autocorrelation/spatial correlation (since it is mostly cross sectional 
data) is just testing that one restructuring does not affect another restructuring. If it were, it 
would show up in our test and then there is a problem with the model.  
Our sample (without gearing) consists of 97 observations while the other sample (with 
gearing) consists of 71, because we could not find any information regarding gearing of 
certain debtors. This made us use two different boundaries in regards to the decision rule for 
autocorrelation. From the table below we can determine that we appear to have 
autocorrelation in the model where we measure abnormal return with the independent variable 
“gearing” removed. It is very odd; it would imply that gearing was a variable that impacted 
abnormal returns of other restructurings; however this cannot be asserted with certainty 
because it can be something else involved in the sample. However when “gearing” is removed 
autocorrelation (positive) is present. 
Durbin-Watson Abnormal returns without Gearing 0.05 level of significance 
d 1.431 
n=97 
95 observations 1.602 ≤ 1.431 ≤ 1.732 
100 observations 1.631 ≤ 1.431 ≤ 1.736 
Decision rules 
Null hypothesis Decision If Our d 
No positive autocorrelation Reject 0 < d < dL Yes 
No positive autocorrelation No decision dL ≤ d ≤ dU no 
No negative autocorrelation Reject 4-dL < d < 4 no 
No negative autocorrelation No decision 4-dU ≤ d ≤ 4-dL no 
No positive or negative 
autocorrelation 
  Do not reject dU < d < 4-dU no 
CONCLUSION: We appear to have positive autocorrelation
Table 16: Durbin-Watson (sample without gearing) 
Durbin-Watson  Abnormal Returns with Gearing 0.05 level of significance 
d 1.702 
n=71 
70 observations 1.554 ≤ 1.702 ≤ 1.672 
                                                 
15 (Gujarati, 2006) 
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Decision rules 
Null hypothesis Decision If Our d 
No positive autocorrelation Reject 0 < d < dL no 
No positive autocorrelation No decision dL ≤ d ≤ dU no 
No negative autocorrelation Reject 4-dL < d < 4 no 
No negative autocorrelation No decision 4-dU ≤ d ≤ 4-dL no 
No positive or negative 
autocorrelation 
  Do not reject dU < d < 4-dU Yes 
CONCLUSION: We appear to have no autocorrelation
Table 17: Durbin-Watson (sample with gearing) 
8.2.3. Violation of APR in our Data sample: 
In our sample of bonds financial restructuring there is one financial restructuring that stands 
out with the clear violation of APR. That is Sevan Marine ASA, there were 5 bonds involved 
in the restructuring 4 out of 5 bonds were senior secured bonds and 5th one was senior 
unsecured bond.  
ISIN Seniority Amount 
Outstanding 
Payment 
in Cash 
Fees Share 
offer 
Total 
proceed to 
bondholders
NO0010366966 Senior 
Secured 
227.5 MUSD 165 MUSD 9 MUSD NO 156 MUSD 
NO0010582950 Senior 
Secured 
111.75 
MUSD
94.4 MUSD 4.5 MUSD NO 89.96 MUSD 
NO0010582968 Senior 
Secured 
100 MUSD 84.5 MUSD 4.5 MUSD NO 80.03MUSD 
NO0010391642 Senior 
Secured 
740 MNOK 525.7 
MNOK 
50.3 MNOK NO 475.3 MNOK
NO0010593627 Senior 
Unsecured 
700 MNOK N/A N/A Yes  
Table 18: Sevan Marine ASA APR violation 
According to the APR senior secured claims should have been satisfied in full before senior 
unsecured bonds would receive any proceeds. But it is clearly evident that seniors secured 
Sevan Marine ASA bonds were not satisfied fully during the restructuring process and still 
senior unsecured bondholders receives shares in the restructured Sevan Marine ASA.  
In our sample we have a couple of other restructurings that can be loosely termed as 
violations of APR in the sense that senior bondholders did not receive full payment of their 
claim and junior bondholder’s received some value. These APR violations are objectionable 
for the fact the way equity and bonds are valued. We used nominal share price rather than 
market price to value the equity because distressed firm’s market share price is meaningless. 
To value bonds we used a Lattice model which is a single factor model and only takes into 
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account interest rate fluctuations in valuing the bonds cash flows and the probability of 
default table that we used to discount these cash flow to the date of the restructuring proposal 
was not for Norway or Nordic countries but it was a probability of default table for the world 
and also we assumed that the bonds issued by these firm that are in distress now are CCC 
rated because of the fact that we do not had actual rating for the bonds available. So for the 
way equity and bonds are valued and then compared to the face value of bonds to calculate 
recoveries will not tell the true recoveries for the bondholders so that is why we are terming 
these as loose APR deviations.  From the table below it can be seen clearly that in most of the 
cases recoveries for the senior bondholders has been less than 100% and junior claimants 
receive some value post restructuring  which could be seen as APR violation. 
Borrower ISIN Seniority Recoveries as % of 
Face Value 
Interoil Exploration 
and Production 
ASA 
NO0010363567 Senior secured 62.50% 
NO0010362809 Senior unsecured 51.21% 
Master Marine AS NO0010431315 Senior Secured 41.25% 
NO0010372469 Subordinate 
unsecured 
32.24% 
Nexus Floating 
Production Ltd 
NO0010357387 Senior unsecured 82.38% 
NO0010375207 Subordinate 54.29% 
Reservoir 
Exploration 
Technology ASA 
NO0010368285 Senior unsecured 41.56% 
NO0010403546 Senior unsecured 41.88% 
NO0010503394 Senior unsecured 10.44% 
NO0010302201 Subordinate 7.05% 
Rowan Drilling 
Norway AS- Skeie 
Drilling ASA 
NO0010356009 Senior Secured 83.37% 
NO0010376247 Subordinate 9.62% 
Marine Accurate 
Well ASA 
NO0010355803 Senior unsecured 76.66% 
NO0010378763 Subordinate 
unsecured 
49.95% 
Table 19: Sample APR violation 
It is assumed that when a firm defaults on its debt obligations, bondholders can take over the 
firm and divide the proceed among themselves based on APR rule, the same rule should apply 
when redistributing distressed firm value among different claimants when a distressed firm is 
restructured because of financial illiquidity, but in our sample data we have observed that 
when the distressed firm goes through restructuring its capital structure to bring the debt level 
to a more sustainable level and existing debt is converted to equity, instead of wiping out old 
equity holders some small portion of equity is given to them, usually 5% of equity value is 
given to old shareholders and 95% of the value is given to bondholders in debt to equity swap. 
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There could be any number of explanations for it, one is that debtor in possession has a lot of 
bargaining power in the negotiation and secondly costs are borne by the firm and in most 
cases in restructuring old equity holders has nothing to lose by holding out the negotiation 
process and cost related to the restructuring is borne by the firm, which drives down the firm 
value bondholders are going to receive after the restructuring, so they give some portion of 
the equity to old equity holders to maximize their gain after the restructuring process to 
preserve more value they can get against their claims.  
 
 
 
Bond ISIN 
 
 
Borrower 
Ownership Interest (Post Restructuring) 
 
Old Equity 
 
 
New Equity* 
 
Others** 
 
Total 
NO0010378227 Wega Mining 11.49% 33.19% 55.32% 100% 
NO0010357676 Valhalla Oil and 
Gas AS 
13.30% 53.23% 33.47% 100% 
NO0010396211 Transeuro 
Energy Corp 
49.73% 24.64% 25.62% 100% 
Multiple ISINs Transeuro 
Energy Corp 
3.35% 96.65% n/a 100% 
NO0010593627 Sevan Marine 
ASA 
30% 10% 60% 100% 
Multiple ISINs Rowan Drilling 
Norway AS- 
Skeie Drilling 
ASA 
 
4.02% 
 
39.64% 
 
56.34% 
 
100% 
NO0010302201 
NO0010503394 
Reservoir 
Exploration 
Technology 
ASA 
 
57% 
 
43% 
 
n/a 
 
100% 
NO0010373400 Proserve Group 
ASA 
3.10% 86.90% 
 
10% 100% 
NO0010336308 Geysir 
Petroleum hf 
5% 95% n/a 100% 
NO0010446503 Front 
Exploration AS 
(Discover 
Petroleum AS) 
0.90% 78.84% 20.73% 100% 
NO 0010400328  
NO 0010366503  
NO 0010545676 
 
Aladdin Oil & 
Gas ASA 
 
31.93% 
 
68.00% 
 
0.07% 
 
100% 
NO010324460  
NO010346158  
NO010398167  
 
Artumas Group 
Inc/Wentworth 
Resources 
2.37% 49.13% n/a 100% 
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NO 0010538473 Blom ASA 86.95% 13.05% n/a 100% 
NO0010364250 
N0010506728 
 
Ceon ASA, 
Ceon AS1 & 
Ceon AS2 
 
66.67% 
 
33.33% 
 
n/a 
 
100% 
 
NO0010398142 Codfarmers 
ASA 
47.85% 20.24% n/a 100% 
 
NO0010243801 
NO0010293939 
NO0010495559 
NO0010307309 
NO0010307317 
 
 
 
Crew Gold Corp 
 
 
5.00% 
 
 
91.80% 
 
 
3.20% 
 
 
100% 
 
NO0010538127  
NO0010538119 
 
Eitzen Maritime 
Services ASA 
(1st) 
69.35% 30.65% n/a 100% 
NO0010593510 
NO0010593502 
Eitzen Maritime 
Services ASA 
(2nd) 
5.00% 95.00% n/a 100% 
N0010518103 Krillsea Group 
ASA 
90.28% 9.72% n/a 100% 
NO0010368780 
NO0010404676 
 
Malaka Oil AB 58.30% 41.70% n/a 100% 
NO0010355803 
NO0010378763 
NO0010461585 
 
Marine 
Accurate Well 
ASA - 
MARACC 
1.37% 52.49% n/a 100% 
NO0010372469 Master Marine 
AS 
12.15% 7.11% 80.74% 100% 
NO0010523871 Nattopharma 
ASA 
84.89% 15.11% n/a 100% 
NO0010373244 Oceanteam 
Shipping 
ASA/Oceanteam 
Power&Umbilica
l ASA 
 
 
38.10% 
 
 
61.90% 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
100% 
NO0010450687 Oren Oil/Saga 
Oil 
6.50% 71.30% n/a 100% 
Table 20: Post restructuring ownership structure for debt to equity swap 
*Bonds converted to equity as a result of financial restructuring. 
** New share issued beside debt to equity swap e.g.  in private placement and to employees etc.  
We know that equity has a residual claim on the assets of the firm so in financial restructuring 
they should only get value when all the claimants’ value has been recovered but from the 
table above we can clearly see that old equity is not wiped out post restructuring but did retain 
some value. Even though in some cases they should have not received anything and should be 
completely wiped out but bondholders still gave them some stake into the restructure firm. 
There could be a couple of reasons for that one major reason is that management is acting in 
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the best interest of shareholders and during the restructuring negotiations they use their 
bargaining power to delay the outcome of the restructuring, and when they do that it is 
creditors who bear the cost of restructuring because as time passes, the cost of restructuring 
will increase, that will lead to decrease in firm value bondholders will receive, to overcome 
this hold out bondholders give some value of the restructured firm to the old equity holders. 
The other big reason could be if the old equity holder is a manager or owner of the distressed 
firm and have superior knowledge or skills which are hard to replace and he/she can help the 
distress firm post restructuring perform better, so give him/her an incentive to work, 
bondholders carve out some value of the restructured firm for old equity holder. 
8.2.4. Time to maturity and Gearing 
We decided to examine two additional variables “time to maturity” and “gearing” more in 
detail to find out if they have any significant impact on bondholder’s abnormal returns. Actual 
time to maturity is calculated from the date of the restructuring proposal to bonds original 
settlement date. We have some negative time to maturity in our sample because the 
restructuring proposal was put forward after the settlement date of the bond when firm 
defaulted on its interest and principal amount. The graph below depicts the histogram of  time 
to maturity of the distressed bond at the time of the restructuring proposal date and it can be 
clearly seen that there is no pattern of distribution and distress bonds had between six month 
to 3 or 4 year left to the actual maturity date.  
 
Figure 32: Histogram of Time to maturity of distress bonds in the sample 
As in the statistical analysis no relationship (linear) could be seen, and the scatter plot below 
does not show any visually clear pattern regarding the ultimate recovery and the time left to 
original maturity at default. It seems from our sample that it does not have any real impact on 
bondholders return from financial restructuring. 
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Figure 33: Regression result of time to maturity and abnormal returns 
We also examined gearing (leverage- debt to equity ratio) of the firms involved in 
restructurings to see if gearing has any significant impact on bondholders’ abnormal return. 
The histogram of the dispersion of the sample´s gearing shows that firms involved in 
restructuring have around a debt to equity ratio of 2 to 7 (i.e. debt constitutes around 66% to 
88% of the capital structure) which is quite high. This could be expected since companies in 
trouble usually have high leverage and problems servicing the debt. 
 
Figure 34: Histogram of Gearing (Leverage) 
By examining the scatter plot below it can been observed that the p-value is very high, which 
means that there is no relationship between high gearing and bondholders’ return in 
restructuring and also R2 is around 2% which is very low 
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Figure 35: Regression results of gearing and abnormal returns 
8.2.5. Time in restructuring 
We also examined the effect of time spent in restructuring on the abnormal return for the 
distress firms’ bondholder. We investigated this effect because the more time spend in 
restructuring will create more uncertainty regarding the future of the distress firm and its 
assets may even decline further in their value.  By examining the histogram below we can 
observe that most of the proposals were given and accepted within half a year and the 
majority of them in one and a half month. There are some uncertainties regarding this, 
because maybe the distressed debtor were in private negotiations with their creditors which 
were not made public and since we have only been able to work with official announcements 
from NT that creates little uncertainty around the time spent in restructuring. We simply do 
not know if any discussions were initiated before NT published information. 
 
Figure 36: Histogram of time spent in restructuring. 
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The regression analysis did not provide us with any information regarding the time spent in 
restructurings and the recovery. That is not to say it is not there, we have no significant 
indications about it however. 
8.2.6. Multicollinearity16  
We also needed to test our sample and model for multicollinearity, which is to say does one of 
our independent variables have a linear relationship with some of the other independent 
variables. 
Testing for multicollinearity was done by auxiliary regression, in which we regressed each 
independent variable against the others in a multiple regression; we then obtained the R² from 
those regressions and performed F-tests. This was done because if there were no 
multicollinearity in the sample R² should statistically significantly be zero. So if we received 
significance of “F”, there is a large chance that we have multicollinearity. 
Abnormal Return model without Gearing, 0.05 significance-level 
Dependent Variable Value of R2 Value of F Is F significant 
Debt exchange 0.06 3.23 Yes 
Oil & Gas 0.24 15.17 Yes 
Oil & Gas Services 0.22 13.54 Yes 
Critical F 3.09   
Table 21: Result from the test of multicollinearity for sample without gearing 
As we can see the final model for Abnormal return where we removed the independent 
variable “gearing” does suffer from multicollinearity. 
Abnormal Return model with Gearing, 0.05 significance-level 
Dependent Variable Value of R2 Value of F Is F significant 
Oil & Gas 0.19 16.82 Yes 
Oil & Gas Services 0.19 16.82 Yes 
Critical F 3.98   
Table 22: Result from the test of multicollinearity for sample with gearing 
                                                 
16 This section is based on  (Gujarati, 2006) 
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And when gearing is included in our sample the model suffers from multicollinearity as well. 
In fact this is a recurring theme for our variables as can be seen below. 
 
Sample without Gearing 
Dependent Variable Value of R2 Value of F Is F significant 
FIXED/FRN-Dummy 0.39 4.12 Yes 
Senior/Subordinated 0.28 2.57 Yes 
Secured/Unsecured 0.25 2.19 Yes 
Debt exchange 0.33 3.23 Yes 
Debt to Equity 0.54 7.69 Yes 
Combination dummy for ownership after 
restructuring 
0.42 4.79 Yes 
Outstanding in mNOK 0.15 1.13 No 
Oil & Gas 0.85 37.16 Yes 
Oil & Gas Services 0.88 49.09 Yes 
Shipping 0.81 28.43 Yes 
Mining 0.67 13.02 Yes 
Other 0.78 22.63 Yes 
Time-to-maturity 0.29 2.70 Yes 
Time in Restructuring 0.32 3.09 Yes 
Critical F 1.84   
Table 23: Regression results from multicollinearity for sample (without gearing) 
Sample with Gearing 
Dependent Variable Value of R2 Value of F Is F significant 
FIXED/FRN-Dummy 0.396 2.62 Yes 
Senior/Subordinated 0321 1.89 Yes 
Secured/Unsecured 0.237 1.24 No 
Debt exchange 0.459 3.39 Yes 
Debt to equity 0575 5.40 Yes 
Combination dummy for ownership 
after restructuring 
0.564 5.18 Yes 
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Outstanding in mNOK 0.19 0.94 No 
Oil & Gas 0.92 52.04 Yes 
Oil & Gas Services 0.95 77.19 Yes 
Shipping 0.92 51.37 Yes 
Mining 0.85 23.12 Yes 
Other 0.83 20.69 Yes 
"gearing" 0.29 1.70 No 
Time-to-maturity 0.42 3.00 Yes 
Time in Restructuring 0.29 1.69 No 
Critical F 1.87   
Table 24: Regression results from multicollinearity for sample (with gearing) 
Most of our independent variables have some kind of relationship with the others independent 
variables. Multicollinearity of our independent variables further reduces the use of our model 
for statistical inference.  
8.2.7. Conclusion of Regression Analysis: 
The first hypothesis regarding bondholders always accept the restructuring deal when their 
recoveries are higher than the trading price recoveries and if not they will not accept the 
restructuring deal. This hypothesis is rejected for the fact that bondholders have accepted 
restructuring where their recoveries from the restructuring were lower than the trading price 
recoveries.  
The second hypothesis that when  bondholders accept restructuring proposals then it should 
not depend on what type of instrument (debt exchange or debt to equity swap) has been used 
is partly rejected for the fact that our regression results proves that debt exchange has 
significant impact on the bondholders abnormal returns. Or in other words there is a 
relationship between debt exchange and higher abnormal return.  
The econometric analysis could not provide us with any conclusive evidence for hypotheses 
three about seniority. So from the statistical analysis it seems that there is a relationship 
between two industries and the type of restructuring that are performed. The models are 
however not fit for inference and we cannot make any quantitative projections that can be 
tested. 
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The final regression model does prove the relationship between returns bondholders get in 
financial restructurings and independent variables (such as type of instrument and industry 
used) but we could not use our models for any predictions because it did not pass the BLUE 
criteria. However the model did provide us with the “proof” that debt exchanges were in fact 
superior to debt to equity swaps in regards to recoveries and abnormal returns during financial 
restructuring, but it is not clear to what extent.  
Another important question is, does seniority matter? Seniority managed to pass the first 
trimming of the regression model, and then in later regression models it was discarded as 
insignificant due to high p-values. We could not find any proof of a relationship between 
seniority of the bond and abnormal returns, which is not to say there is none because theory 
tells us that senior bondholders receive full value of their claim before junior claimants 
receives any proceeds (APR). In a way this is an answer to the question of APR deviations. If 
Seniority of bonds would have been proven a significant independent variable in the model, 
APR-violations would not show up too often in our sample. But we could not find any 
conclusive evidence in our sample that seniority of bonds is a significant factor in determining 
bondholders’ returns in financial restructuring.  
The model gave us two other variables that seemed to be related to abnormal returns, and that 
was industry type (Oil & Gas and Oil & Gas Services). Those two industries appear to 
increase the abnormal return and recoveries if distressed bonds were issued by these industries 
and have a positive impact on bondholders’ returns from restructuring. But it should be kept 
in the mind that our models did not pass the criterion, so that this conclusion should not be 
used for statistical inference.  
9. Limitations	and	recommendation	for	future	research:	
The limitations in the analysis comes from the small sample which we could not increase in a 
time efficient way. Scouring through every bond in the Norwegian market over a longer time 
was not simply an option for us because of time constraint. So we tried to get the related data 
from Norsk Tillitsmann website, looking for the companies that went through restructuring 
because of financial distress. 
The fact that comparison between the ultimate recoveries in the debt to equity exchanges 
using nominal values decrease the value of the restructuring proposal but this was done 
because of the reason described in the section on equity valuation and also because of the fact 
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that we wanted to be consistent across the dataset and trading price for all the companies were 
not available on DataStream and Oslo børs.  Also if the restructuring had warrants, these were 
not included in the calculation of ultimate recoveries simply because some of the warrants 
issues were too complicated and not enough information were available to value them. If 
further research could be carried out these limitations could be addressed in a more 
appropriate manner.  
The analysis of debt to equity was limited from the fact that some of the borrowers in the 
sample were really hard to find information regarding concentration of shareholders. Some 
had later gone in to bankruptcy or got bought up and the homepages where we could search 
for annual reports and get the figures from were not available. 
Another limitation for the research was that Reuters DataStream did not have information 
regarding bonds that were below investment grade in Scandinavia to use for a better yield 
curve that could be transformed and more accurately given us better discount factors in the 
Lattice models. 
The model choice for valuing the restructuring proposal was Lattice model, there are other 
models available to find the “fair” value which was not included in the research, and again if 
this could be looked into by someone doing further research on this matter they can employ 
different methods of choice for valuing the deals.  
The liquidity spread that has been added to the spread is for the U.S. corporate bonds, so in 
that sense it may not have correctly represented the liquidity spread for the sample of 
Norwegian bonds, a better effort could be devoted to find the appropriate liquidity spread that 
will be more representative of the Norwegian bond market for different classes of securities.  
The major limitation for this analysis is, it is only representative of Norwegian bond market, 
and conclusion drawn from the analysis could not be generalized for different other bond 
markets.  It would be interesting to conduct further research into the matter to investigate if 
the Norwegian bond market is same as other bond markets or there is something inherently 
different. 
For further research on a similar subject and in a similar fashion, we recommend to involve 
financial institution that deal with similar issues on regular basis and have them as partners in 
the project. The data that we had was limited in scope and if provided with more data through 
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the collaborating financial institutions, it can provide for a better understanding of the issue 
and conclusion can be even more authentic.  
It is the authors’ firm belief that someone with the possibility of obtaining even more data that 
they can sort through and find a larger sample, they might be able to find a relationship. The 
implication of this thesis is not a firm reaffirming of theory, however it is a small piece of the 
puzzle to look for evidence confirming the hypotheses regarding debt (from the creditor and 
distressed investors point of view). 
If it is possible to get around the privacy laws regarding bondholders which could be used for 
researching the possibility of finding a relationship between ultimate recoveries and the 
amount of the bonds that were held by a single investor. We do believe that it could shed 
more light on the phenomena of distressed restructuring, due to the fact that a large block-
holder of a borrowers bonds has an immense power to steer a restructuring, he/she can just 
refuse to accept a proposal. 
10. Final	conclusion		
The thesis has not been able to decisively either confirm or reject what the theories regarding 
recoveries stated about the relationship between collateral, seniority ownership structure 
industry type etc. and ultimate recoveries. But there were some evidence in this study from 
the descriptive and the econometric analysis that the relationship mentioned above are 
producing higher recoveries than others. 
In relation to the theories regarding seniority and collateral of the bond there seems to be no 
confirmation, but this does not mean that theory is flawed it is just that the sample that the 
thesis used was that an overwhelming part of the bonds were seniors. It is hard for the authors 
to draw any meaningful conclusion with the data at hand. 
Even though the analysis in this research has not been able to produce a statistical significant 
relationship between any variable in the data set to the explanation of ultimate recovery in the 
Norwegian bond market but still it finds plausible relationship between the variables indeed, 
no hard evidence none the less.  
From the regression and descriptive analysis it is evident that the most important variables 
that increase the likelihood of distress firm’s creditors to obtain higher ultimate recoveries 
than trading price recoveries are, the borrower in the restructuring should be oil and gas 
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related  and  the restructuring should also be a debt exchange, this result is in confirmatory 
with (Moody's, 2011).  
The conclusion for the research is that there appears to be no merit for the theory’s statements 
regarding seniority and collateral in relation to ultimate recoveries and abnormal returns in 
Norwegian bond restructuring for our sample, even though descriptive analysis pointed out 
that fact. 
There are strong indications however that industry and type of proposal given are factors that 
seem relevant, however nothing conclusive can be said regarding the exact relationship, there 
might very well be other variables beyond the scope of this research that can explain the 
variance in more detail.  
There seems to be a negative relationship between a clear ownership and ultimate recoveries 
as well, it might just be that a dispersed ownership indicates a certain level of sophistication in 
financial restructuring negotiations; however this is not something that can be proved or 
unproved in any way in this thesis because of privacy law surrounding the ownership 
information of who and how much an individual investors holds distressed securities.  
We also examined if bondholders recoveries are affected by the gearing (leverage) of the 
distressed firm and also by the time to maturity (settlement date) of the bonds. In the 
regression analysis we did not find these to be significant affecting bondholders’ returns but 
we did notice that almost all of the firms had 66% to 80% debt in their capital structure. And 
we believed that high leverage is the reason for them to be in distress. 
In our sample of bonds financial restructuring there is one financial restructuring that stands 
out with the clear violation of APR. That is Sevan Marine ASA, there were 5 bonds involved 
in restructuring 4 out of 5 bonds were senior secured bonds and 5th one was senior unsecured 
bond. According to the APR senior secured claims should have been satisfied in full before 
senior unsecured bond would receive any proceeds. But it is clearly evident that seniors 
secured Sevan Marine ASA bonds were not satisfied fully during the restructuring process 
and still senior unsecured bondholders receive shares in restructured Sevan Marine ASA. We 
also found out some loose violation of APR in our data sample, these are the violation when 
debt is exchanged for equity, and new equity did not receive 100% of their recoveries and still 
old equity holders got some value during restructuring. Usually post restructuring 5% of 
equity value is given to old shareholders and 95% of the value is given to bondholders in debt 
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to equity swap. There could be number of explanations for it, one is that debtor in possession 
has a lot of bargaining power in the negotiation and secondly costs are borne by the firm and 
in most cases in restructuring old equity holders has nothing to lose by holding out the 
negotiation process and cost related to the restructuring is borne by the firm, which drives 
down the firm value bondholders are going to receive after the restructuring, so they give 
something portion of the equity to old equity holders to maximize their gain after the 
restructuring process to preserve more value they can get against their claims.  
From a creditor’s or investor’s point of view in the Norwegian bond market the best choice 
seems to be to positions oneself in the Oil & Gas industry and hope for debt exchanges in 
restructurings. 
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12. Appendices	
 
12.1. The	Term‐structure	
12.1.1. Term-structure of interest rates 
The term structure or the yield curve is the depiction of the relationship between the yield on 
bonds of similar credit quality but different maturity (FABOZZI & MANN, 2005). The term 
structure described in this part is the treasury yield curve. The treasury yield curve is the yield 
curve that represents the Norwegian bonds and bills issued and actively traded in the 
secondary market.  
The yield curve is calculated either by using polynomial regressions (Benninga, 2008) or by 
bootstrapping (FABOZZI & MANN, 2005). The focus of this thesis is not to model the term 
structure so the reader is advised to research the subject more by reading the sources provided 
if interest arises on how the term structure are calculated and estimated. It is however worth to 
note that usually there are three distinct yield curves academia and practitioners referrers to: 
 
Figure 37: The most common yield curve (data taken from Yahoo finance) 
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They are the “normal upward sloping”, the “downward sloping” and the “flat” term structures. 
There are yet another called a “humped” yield curve, below is a illustration from Norway.  
 
Figure 38: Norwegian yield curve (humped) (data taken from DataStream) 
The term structure is used for many applications in finance and economics, one application is 
to calculate forward rates (FABOZZI & MANN, 2005). Another and more relevant for this 
thesis is to price the cash flows from bonds and ultimately estimate the price an investor 
should consider when purchasing the bond. 
12.2. Interbank	offered	rates	
12.2.1. LIBOR 
London Inter-Bank Offered Rate is a benchmark rate for which rate a leading bank can obtain 
unsecured funding for a given period. 
It was created in the 1980s when London position as an international financial center grew. 
UK banks asked the BBA (British Banker Association) to develop a method to calculate an 
interest to use in syndicated loans. That rate was called BBAIRS (British Banker Association 
Interest Rate Settlement). It later became renamed BBALIBOR i.e. LIBOR.(BBA, 2012) 
To define LIBOR the BBA asks every contributor: 
“At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting 
inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11am?” 
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So what is clear is that LIBOR is not necessarily based on transactions that actually occurred 
in the market. But rather on the perceived lowest rates each contributor estimates they can 
receive in an inter-bank loan. (BBA, 2012)The rates are quoted as annualized interest rates, 
which is a market convention. The rate is used as a benchmark for short term interest rates 
globally, it´s used in derivatives and loan documentation such as Floating Rate Notes 
(FRNs).(BBA, 2012) 
LIBOR is quoted for ten currencies (GBP, USD, JPY, CHF, CAD, AUD, EUR, DKK, SEK & 
NZD).  There are a range of 6 to 18 contributors and they are chosen twice a year by the 
Foreign Exchange and Money Markets Committee (FX&MM Committee) by the activities of 
the banks/contributors on the FX and SWAP markets. (BBA, 2012) 
The designated agent who calculates LIBOR is Thomson Reuters (TR), they do it by the 
guide lines from FX&MM Committee, and each morning between 11:00 and 11:10 an 
individual responsible at the bank at the cash desk inputs their contribution to the people at 
Thomson Reuters by an application that is linked to the LIBOR setting team at TR.(BBA, 
2012) 
The rates are calculated by a trimmed arithmetic mean. That means that when TR has 
received the contributor’s rates they rank them from lowest to highest and then exclude the 
25% highest and the 25% lowest of the rates received. After calculation TR distributes the 
quote for the LIBOR rates themselves and by licensed data providers. The maturities involved 
are “spot”, 1w, 2w, 1m, 2m, 3m, 4m, 5m, 6m, 7m, 8m, 9m, 10m, 11m & 12m. (BBA, 2012) 
12.2.2. NIBOR 
Norway Inter Bank Offer Rate, the NIBOR is a reference rate that reflects the unsecured 
lending between banks in Norway in Norwegian Kroner (NOK).(Norway, 2011) 
As with LIBOR there are contributors/member banks that submit the rate to an individual 
bank in the FX and money market in Norway they estimate that they could borrow at for the 
maturities mentioned above in the LIBOR. The reporting is done by TR as well. (Norway, 
2011) 
NIBOR as with LIBOR is an arithmetic average that has been trimmed. If there are more than 
seven banks that have published the two lowest and two highest interest rates are omitted, if 
there are five, six or seven banks, then the highest and lowest rates are omitted, and if there 
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are fewer banks all rates are used.(Norway, 2011) NIBOR are published every market day, 
normally at 12:00 or at 10:00 at days with shorter market hours. (Norway, 2011).  
12.3. Bonds	and	their	variation17	
12.3.1. Treasury Securities  
Treasury securities are debt instruments issued by the state/government. They are usually 
considered risk free and commonly used to price and hedge other fixed income securities. 
There are three basic types of government bonds, the “bills, notes & bonds” in this thesis the 
term “bonds” will almost always be used interchangeably. The treasury bills are issued at a 
discount to face value and the investors return is the difference of the discount and the face 
value. The usual length on maturity on these bills is one year or less 
Treasury notes are securities issued with longer maturities than one year, but not more than 
ten years, and they pay a fixed coupon. They are redeemed at face value/par and are sold at 
par usually, so the return to the investor is the coupons he or she receives during the term.  
Treasury bonds are securities that have a term that is longer than ten years and pay a coupon, 
they are redeemed at par and sold at par, so the return the investor receives is the coupons 
during the term. 
Naturally if the investor does not buy the securities at the issuing/auction they may pay more 
or less than par and have another return than just coupons. The primary market for 
government securities is leading banks that buy the securities on auctions; private investors 
can also invest in the securities in the primary auction. 
In Norway the primary dealers for Norwegian government debt is DNB, Danske Bank, 
Nordea, SEB and Handelsbanken. The Norwegian securities for government debt are 
primarily treasury bills and treasury notes, although the notes are called bonds. The interest 
rates for treasury debt are quoted per annum. 
12.3.2. Corporate Bonds 
A corporate bond is in its essence an instrument of debt where the issuer pays a specified 
percentage on the bonds face value on pre-determined dates, and repays the principal at 
maturity together with the accrued interest. This debt instrument would be called a fixed 
coupon option less bond. The bondholders have a legal claim of the assets of the issuer in 
                                                 
17 Section 12.1 is based on (FABOZZI & MANN, 2005) 
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default that are senior to common stock and preferred shares, and if a default occurs they will 
be first in line (depending on seniority) to the value in recovery be it liquidation or a 
restructuring. 
The fixed coupon bondholder will get the interest at set dates that can be in annual, semi-
annual or any other determined period according to the indentures. Indentures are the 
contracts that govern the bonds claim on the issuer and actions the borrower can take. 
It is common that a trustee are brought in as a third party how are experienced in the 
“legalese” in the indentures, and who monitors that the issuer are not in any breach of the 
contract. In Norway the trustee is Norsk Tillitsmann (NT) which was established 1993 by 
leading banks and financial institutions to fill the need for monitoring that the bond indentures 
were followed by the issuers. (Tillitsmann, 2012) 
The maturity of the bond is the date on which the issuer have fulfilled its obligations to the 
bondholders and repaid the principal and accrued interest according to the agreed upon price. 
Depending on the indentures the loan may be redeemed earlier fully or partially before the full 
maturity has been reached, one special case is called “sinking funds”. Sinking funds is a term 
used to describe when the issuer has agreed upon in the indentures to redeem/repay parts of 
the loan during the term of the loan. The term fund comes from the fact that earlier the issuer 
saved money in a fund for maturity, now it is referred to the fact that they repay parts of the 
loan during the term in cash. 
The interest on a bond may be paid annually which is when the issuer pays the interest after a 
year has passed from the last payment. Semi-annually payment means that the interest is paid 
each six months in arrears. There are also quarterly payments and something called floating 
rates.  
Besides the floating rate interest the interest is usually fixed, or it might be a step-up, which 
means the fixed coupon are increased (or lowered, step-down) after a period. 
A corporate bond can be secured or unsecured; if it is unsecured the correct terminology is 
that the bond is a debenture. However in the thesis they are referred to as bonds. 
12.3.3. Bond collateral 
Mortgage bonds are bonds that are secured in the indentures by the borrower’s properties, 
which means that in the case of a default or bankruptcy the bondholders can legally take 
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control of the properties and sell them to recover their claim. In the indentures it is called that 
the bond holders have “first lien” on the property. This means that they have the legal right to 
sell the property to satisfy the unpaid claim. 
A first lien secured mortgage bond usually has a lower coupon than an unsecured debenture 
because of that legal right. However, usually bondholders use that lien to leverage the claim in 
a restructuring instead of taking control and selling it. 
When a borrower does not have the amount of property that they can secure the bond with a 
first lien mortgage they can secure the claim with what is called a “collateral trust bond”, that 
is when the borrower is a holding/parent company to subsidiaries the issuer secures the claim 
in the shares of the subsidiaries. It does not have to be limited to shares it can be any other 
collateral such as bonds the holding company owns, or notes. The issuer can secure bonds on 
other things such as charter vessels and drilling rigs etc. 
The unsecured bond does not have to be the worst alternative. The fact that they are unsecured 
does not mean they are not without any claim on the borrowers assets. They have a claim of 
all the assets of the borrower and depending on the seniority of the debenture they have a 
legal right before other creditors that are unsecured in a bankruptcy. They can also be 
protected in the sense that in the indentures there may be written in “negative-pledges” which 
means that if the borrower issues more debt, the first unsecured claim are given the same 
rights as the newly issued bonds and be secured on the same way. 
 If a bond is subordinated it means that they rank after secured and unsecured bonds and other 
claims ahead in the priority in a bankruptcy, these are usually more expensive for the issuer 
since they need to pay higher interest on them. 
There are also something called guaranteed bonds, these are bonds that are issued by one 
entity in a group of companies but are guaranteed by another company in the group. 
12.3.4. Embedded options 
If a corporate bond has an embedded option that gives the issuer the right to buy back parts or 
the whole claim before the maturity they are referred to as callable bonds. The call option 
might be on a set of specific dates, ore during the entire term of the bond. They are usually 
cheaper since they are possible to retire earlier if interest rate goes down. There are two types 
of call provisions, the “fixed price call provision” and the “make whole call provision”. The 
fixed call provisions are usually set to a specific schedule with different call prices according 
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to a schedule in the indentures. At first the call price is substantially above par and declines 
during the schedule during the term. 
The make whole call provision is a bit more complicated. The call price is calculated as the 
present value of the remaining cash flows subject to a floor price equal to par value. The cash 
flows are discounted by the yield on a treasury security with the same maturity and an added 
premium called make whole call premium. 
A corporate bond with an embedded put option is a bond that gives the bondholder the right to 
sell the security back to the borrower at par value on designated dates. So if the interest rates 
rise shortly after the issue date, the bondholders can reinvest at the higher rates. There are 
“hard puts” and “soft puts”, a hard put means that the bond must be redeemed in cash, 
whereas soft puts the bond may be redeemed for shares or other debt instruments or 
combinations of them, soft puts can be found in convertible bonds. 
A corporate bond that is convertible is a bond that has the right to convert the claim in to 
common stock of the borrower. The indentures specify the ratio and the price of the 
conversion. The ratio is adjusted proportionally to splits and dividends in the stock. The right 
to convert can be set to only a limited time ore during the whole term of the bond. They are 
usually callable, so the borrower can force the bondholders to convert the claim. 
12.3.5. Floating Rate Note 
There are corporate bonds that do not have a fixed coupon but are dependent on a reference 
rate and a margin 
Coupon rate = reference rate +/- margin 
Instead, they are referred to as floating rate notes, or simply floaters. 
They were first introduced in the 1970s and are now in nearly every field of the market such 
as government, municipalities, corporate and other structured product such as mortgage and 
asset backed obligations (ABO & MBOs). The most common reference rates for floaters is 
interbank offering rates such as LIBOR and NIBOR, treasury yields and other rates such as 
CD rates. 
If the floater has a limit of how high the reference rate may go that is stipulated in the 
indentures it is said that they have a “cap”, and if they have e limit on how low the reference 
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rate may go they are said to have a “floor”. If they have caps and floors, the floaters is said to 
have a “collar”.(Fabozzi, 2005) Floaters can also have put or call options embedded in them. 
12.3.6. High Yield 
High Yield bonds are bonds considered to not qualify as investment grade by the investors or 
rating agencies, they can be referred to as” junk bonds” also. That does not mean that they 
have to be on the edge of bankruptcy, many are close to be investment grade. They do 
however carry more risk than the investment grade corporate bonds. 
12.3.7. Hybrid Capital 18 
There is another type of instrument that can be found in the capital structure. It is known as 
hybrid capital. In essence it is a bond without a fixed maturity. 
The hybrid capital has a fixed coupon, a fixed principal and is above equity in bankruptcy 
(however it is below other bonds in APR). The instrument usually has embedded call options. 
The option is deferred several years ahead before it can be used; this period is known as the 
“protection period”. The option helps the issuer to be able to issue “risk capital” that actually 
is quite similar to bonds in practice. The pricing of hybrid capital is done by valuing a bundle 
of options. 
12.3.8. Warrants 
Warrants are issued by the borrowing company and can be attached to bonds. A warrant is a 
right to buy a number of shares in the company, and the life of a warrant are usually long 
(some even perpetual).They can be seen as call options issued by the borrower and they issue 
new shares when exercised. 
 
12.4. Bond	Valuation19	
To value a bond, the investor values the cash flows from that bond. The theoretical values are 
calculated by discounting the cash flows by a relevant discount rate. (Hull, 2012). To that 
discount rate a spread may be added to reflect the risk of default and the liquidity of the bond. 
12.4.1. Bond without embedded options 
To price a fixed coupon bond without any options attached to it and with known cash flows, 
and known intervals between the cash flows is mainly a matter of discounting the cash flows 
                                                 
18 This section is based on (Mjøs & Persson, 2010) 
19 Section 12.4 is based on (FABOZZI & MANN, 2005) 
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from the bond to a present value by a discount rate that the investor deems applicable. The 
coupons can be paid in different intervals, the most usual being semi-annual and quarterly, but 
of course also annually. The bond can mature at either par or above “par”, this is information 
that can be gathered from the bond indentures. 
The discount rate used can be a required yield the investor wants to use to discount the cash 
flows with, that means that the buyer of the bond, or potential buyer of the bond are pricing 
the cash flows from the coupon and the maturity par or above at a single discount rate usually 
called just the yield. 
 The yield the buyer requires is often determined by the investor by comparing yields on 
comparable bonds in the market place. In this case comparable means that the bonds should 
have the same maturity, credit quality and also be without embedded options. 
The pricing formula is: 
ܤ݋݊݀	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൌ ܥܨଵሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ ൅
ܥܨଶ
ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻଶ ൅ ⋯൅
ܥܨ௡ ൅ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁
ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ௡  
Where “CF” stands for cash flow, maturity price is the agreed upon price the issuer pays the 
bondholder on the face value like 100%(par) or 103%(above par), the “y” represents the yield, 
the single discount rate that the investor needs or decides is the required rate he or she needs. 
There is however arguments to as to why the investor should discount each cash flow with a 
different discount rate. The investor should view the cash flows as zero coupon bonds and the 
whole bond as a package of Zero Coupon bonds. The investor then makes use of a term 
structure that fits the needs of him or her to value the cash flows from the coupons, and the 
price at maturity. In that case the “y” in the formula above is not the same for every cash flow. 
Instead it is derived from the term-structure (and in those cases the term-structure is a 
government yield curve an appropriate spread is added). 
12.4.2. Bond with embedded options 
When pricing a fixed coupon bond that has options such as a call provisions or put provisions 
attached to them, the investor needs to use different techniques.  
If the option is a call-option to call it at a specific date during the term of the bond, a ordinary 
valuation such as the above(bonds without embedded options) with the discounting by a term-
structure is the first step, the next being a reduction of that price by the option value. To value 
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the option the investor uses an option pricing method such as Black-Scholes and then reduces 
the value of the option less bond with the value of the call-option. 
 The reduction meaning that the issuer has the right to call and redeem the debt when interest 
rates moves in a favorable way to them, and they can raise new debt at cheaper interest rates, 
and the bondholders will have to reinvest the money at a lower rate.  
The opposite is true for a “puttable” bond, and then the option value is added to the bond, 
since bondholders can force the issuer to redeem the debt earlier and reinvest the money at for 
the investor more favorable terms. 
If the option to call the debt is not in what is called a European fashion (set dates) the investor 
needs to use the binomial model to value the bond (or Monte Carlo techniques for example). 
The technique is to use the binomial tree. When setting up the “value-nodes” if it is a call 
option imbedded the value at a node is  
௧ܸ ൌ ܯ݅݊ሾܥ݈݈ܽ	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁, ܸܲሺܨݑݐݑݎ݁	ܥܽݏ݄	ܨ݈݋ݓݏሻሿ  
And if it is a put option embedded  
௧ܸ ൌ ܯܽݔሾܲݑݐ	ܲݎ݅ܿ݁, ܸܲሺܨݑݐݑݎ݁	ܥܽݏ݄	ܨ݈݋ݓݏሻሿ	 
This is from the investor’s point of view. 
The binomial tree will look like this 
  V= Value at maturity 
 V1=Min[Call, V+c1]/(1+r1) V= Value at maturity 
V0=Min[Call, V0+c0]/(1+r0) V1=Min[Call, V+c1]/(1+r1) V= Value at maturity 
Table 25: Binomial Tree 
Where “value at maturity” is the value if the bond is not called and it´s coupon at that date 
(t=2), V1 stands for the value at that node, and call for call price, c1 the coupon at t=1, r1 is 
the short rate that is used for discount. V0 is the value at t=0, c0 is the coupon at t=0, r0 is the 
short rate used for discount at that date. 
The short rate used here can either be a short rate that is constructed through either the 
calibrated term-structure that is appropriate to the bonds credit rating etc., or a short rate taken 
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from calibrating the par yield of a government zero-curve and an added spread that is 
appropriate. The instrument with an embedded put option is very similar; the difference is that 
instead of the “min-function” the “max-function” mentioned above is used in the nodes. 
12.4.3. Floating Rate Notes (FRNs) 
To price a FRN ordinary discounting of cash flows cannot be used, since the coupons are 
dependent on a reference rate. The coupons are adjusted at every node due to this 
fact.(FABOZZI, 2002) The technique is similar to the fixed coupon bond with an embedded 
option. The investor needs to use binomial trees and work recursive to finally get the value. 
First a binomial tree for the short rate are needed, after that a valuation tree.  
    N(HHHH) 
   N(HHH) N(HHHL) 
  N(HH) N(HHL) N(HHLL) 
 N(H) N(HL) N(HLL) N(HLLL) 
N N(L) N(LL) N(LLL) N(LLLL) 
Table 26: Binomial Tree of short rate 
To value the FRN at “N” the initial node, the investor starts at the end. To make an example a 
binomial tree is constructed with the reference rate first which are assumed to be based on 
semi-annual movements. The reference rate tree is also assumed to be calibrated. 
 
Figure 39: Reference rate binomial tree 
Then assume a margin of 5%p.a (2,5% semi-annual) 
Short rate ‐ Reference Rate
2,16%
1,58% 1,47%
0,37% 1,08% 1,00%
1,17% 0,36% 0,73% 0,68%
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Figure 40: coupon rate binomial tree 
Now, assume that in this case the investor believes the instrument is not riskier than the 
reference rate and he or she is willing to discount the instruments cash flows with the 
binomial tree of the short rate, also assume that the FRN matures at 100% of par. Then to 
value this FRN start after 1.5 years and see that after two years the investor have four possible 
values at maturity, which is all the same in the beginning since the FRN adjusts for each node 
to par. 
 
 
From the theory of the binomial model for interest rates it is known that p=0.50 (probability 
for each node to happen). The first thing to do is to use the formula 
 
ܺ ൌ 12 ൤
100 ൅ 0.0408
1.0158 ൅
100 ൅ 0.0408
1.0158 ൨ 
For the yellow marked cell in figure below 
 
The result then is: 
Coupons
4,66%
4,08% 3,97%
2,87% 3,58% 3,50%
3,67% 2,86% 3,23% 3,18%
Value
100,0%
X 100,0%
X X 100,0%
X X X 100,0%
Value
100,0%
X 100,0%
X X 100,0%
X X X 100,0%
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The technique is then used for all the cells back to the initial node, and the value for the FRN 
will be as in figure below 
 
12.4.4. Zero coupon bonds 
Above it was showed how to value a fixed coupon based bond. To price a coupon-less i.e. 
zero coupon bond the same technique to value a coupon bond is utilized, in the sense that the 
investor values future cash flows.  
In a zero-coupon bond however there are no other cash flows than on maturity. The investor 
discounts the maturity value by either a required yield or the term-structure of a zero curve to 
calculate the price. 
12.4.5. Convertible bonds 
A convertible bond may have many features. The convertible bond is a bond that gives a 
coupon up to maturity and then is redeemed at par as a “regular” bond with the exception that 
the investor may convert the bond in to shares. The shares do not need to be in the issuer, but 
most are. This makes the convertible a package of a “regular” bond and an option on the 
shares of the issuer.  
Convertible = Bond + Option 
The pricing is then a two-step exercise, first value the bond as if it were not a convertible, 
then add the value of the option to that, and the sum are the convertible’s value. 
 
Value
100,0%
102,5% 100,0%
X X 100,0%
X X X 100,0%
Value
100,0%
102,5% 100,0%
104,9% 102,5% 100,0%
107,4% 105,0% 102,5% 100,0%
